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ABSTRACT
Why and when do political actors use violence? This project answers these ques-
tions by exploring the dynamics of the interactions between state authorities and po-
litical dissidents. Both the state and the dissidents face the dilemma of using violence
to achieve their political goals. While structural factors influence state violence and
dissident violence, I contend that we need to examine how the dynamics of the state-
dissident interactions shape these actors’ political behavior. This project first asks
if nonviolent methods of resistance are effective–and perhaps even more successful
than violent methods–why do opposition movements ever resort to violence? I argue
that the efficacy of nonviolent resistance changes over time. When the likelihood of
demobilization increases, dissident movements doubt the effectiveness of nonviolent
resistance and weigh violence as an alternative tactic. The first chapter of this disser-
tation shows that the failure in expanding the size of a movement over several periods
provides increases the risk of demobilization, and so dissident violence. I also argue
while the expansion of the movement decreases the risk of dissident violence, a sud-
den and large expansion in the size of the movement overburdens its monitoring and
sanctioning capacities, which raises the risk of dissident violence. These arguments
are supported empirically using two different datasets. In the second theoretical part
of this project, I examine the effects of foreign interventions on the dynamics of state
repression and dissident violence. I find that the diplomatic statements and efforts
such as disapproving state behavior, asking for political reform, and threatening to
impose economic sanctions and to deploy military forces either did not have a signif-
icant effect, or increased state repression and decreased state concession during the
Arab Spring. Finally, the last part of this project contributes to the literature on
the formal modeling of dissent-repression by developing a recursive model of political
i
violence dynamics. In addition to addressing several drawbacks in the literature, this
model endogenizes the mobilization and demobilization of the movement and explains
how these changes affect dissident violence. Due to the complexity of the developed
mathematical model, I use a computational model to find the optimal outcomes. This
computational model also can be used for simulating the state’s and the dissidents’
behavior under different scenarios.
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Chapter 1
WHY VIOLENCE?
This study aims to deepen our understanding of political violence. The primary
question is why and when governments and political dissidents resort to violence. I
explore the micro-foundations of state-dissident interactions to explain the strategic
use of violence during civil conflict. Although structural theories of political violence
can predict where the risk of political violence is higher, I contend that they fail to
explain theoretically and empirically when the state authorities and the dissidents
use violence to achieve their political goals. To study the timing of political violence,
we need to study how the conflict environment changes in response to state-dissident
interactions when a civil conflict arises. Structural factors such as regime type, eco-
nomic development, and population are rigid variables, and they do not change in the
short-term. They, therefore, cannot explain when political agents resort to violence
over time.
In fact, structural factors can perform well in explaining cross-nationals political
violence, yet they do not explain variations in political violence of a country over
time since these factors usually often change slowly over time. During the Arab
Spring in the Middle East, while Egyptian and Tunisian citizens used civil resistance
to overthrow their governments, the dissidents in Libya and Syria turned to armed
resistance in a similar time period, geographic location, and cultural milieu. How can
we explain these different types of uprisings against the dictators across very similar
cases?
Modern communication technologies not only facilitated the collection of new data
1
on contentious politics but also allowed conflict scholars to access temporally disag-
gregated data at the daily level. This advance in the quality of contentious politics
datasets presents an opportunity for developing and testing more explicit theories of
state-dissident interactions and their impacts on observing political violence. This
dissertation argues for studying dissident violence and state violence through devel-
oping conceptual models of the state’s and the dissidents’ behavior. This dissertation
is not the first attempt to model these interactions and their association with polit-
ical violence (See Lichbach (1987), Moore (2000), and Pierskalla (2010)). However,
unlike these studies that often use structural variables to test their dynamic models
(See Davenport :4), the developed hypotheses in this project explain state violence
and dissident violence using political processes that frequently change as a result of
developments in the dynamics of state-dissident interactions.
“Why violence” has been asked and discussed by numerous philosophers and social
scientists, and they approached this question from different perspectives. For quite a
while, rational choice theorists and their opponents discussed whether humans resort
to violence because of their emotional reactions or their rational decision (See Arendt
(1970) for one of these first discussions.). There also has been a rivalry between
psychological, structural, resource, and opportunity models of political conflicts.1
These studies have made significant contributions to our understanding of political
violence. Thus, I begin with discussing these theories of political violence in this
chapter so that we can evaluate what these theories can and cannot tell us about
political violence, and then I will develop and evaluate my theoretical models in the
following chapter.
1See Rule (1989), Moore and Jaggers (1990), McAdam (1999) for a detailed discussion of these
theories and their differences.
2
1.1 The theories of political violence
A political conflict arises when a group of citizens is dissatisfied with the status
quo, so the members of these groups form an opposition and request a policy change.
If the state authorities and the dissidents fail to resolve this disagreement peacefully,
then we can expect the practice of contentious politics by the opposition groups.
While these political confrontations do not have to be violent, the use of coercive
power by both sides of the conflict is quite common in civil conflicts. Why and
when do these political actors resort to violence? Below, I divided the suggested
scholarly answers to this question into six groups, based on the characteristics of the
actors involved in the conflict and the discussed mechanisms in the offered theoretical
models.
1.1.1 State repression and civil violence
Heterogeneity within society is conjoined with societal disagreement and discon-
tent. It is, therefore, hard to find a Utopian society in which everyone is happy with
the status quo. Indeed, all societies, independent from their political system, cultural
milieu, and geographic location, experience some sort of societal strife. A group of
scholars argues that state officials’ adopted policies towards the contention determine
whether the dissent transforms into violent conflict or not.2 For instance, Lichbach
(1987) explains why dissidents substitute the nonviolent methods of resistance with
violent tactics if the state authorities repress nonviolent campaigns. In other words,
2For example, see Tilly (1978), Lichbach (1987), Moore (1998), Mason and Krane (1989), Good-
win (2001), Mason (2004), Cunningham and Beaulieu (2010).
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since the state repression in response to the nonviolent protests makes these political
actions a costly strategy, then the opposition movement adopts the violent methods
of resistance as its political strategy.
Mason and Krane (1989) also find that employing indiscriminate repression by
the state escalates the conflict since it shifts the masses’ support from the state to
the opposition. In fact, remaining uninvolved in the conflict protects civilians from
its negative effects as long as the authorities do not target civilians. Otherwise, if
the state uses indiscriminate violence against both the opposition groups and the
civilians, then the expected cost of being a rebel or a civilian is the same. Thus,
some of the civilians decide to join the rebellions to benefit the private incentives of
being in the opposition group, from a rationality point of view, or find a retaliation
opportunity, from an emotional point of view.
Furthermore, Skocpol (1979) and Beissinger (1998) argue that the dissident vio-
lence arises when governments do not have the capability of suppressing these dissi-
dents. In Skocpol’s theory, if the military capacity of a state declines, the risk of a
revolution and political violence increases due to the lack of state power in establish-
ing order. In this theory, Skocpol assumes that violence is an inseparable component
of every revolution, so her theory fails to explain how successful civil resistance cam-
paigns can overthrow governments without resorting to violence. Beissinger (1998),
on the other hand, argues that the dissidents decide between violent and nonviolent
methods of resistance based on the vulnerability of a state to each of these tactics.
The failure of the state in containing (non)violent tactics, therefore, sends a signal to
the dissidents to continue and expand (non)violent actions.
While they might seem different, both Lichbach (1998) and Beissinger (1998) ex-
plore the same mechanism, but from different perspectives. Lichbach shows that
4
the dissidents decide between violent and nonviolent activities such that the relative
marginal benefits of these activities equal their relative cost. This argument can be
linked to Beissinger’s argument about how the dissidents’ evaluation of state vul-
nerability shapes their decision about resorting to violence. In fact, in Bessinger’s
theory, by assessing the state capability, the dissidents evaluate the cost and ben-
efit of adopting violent and nonviolent strategies and then substitute these tactics
accordingly.
Although both of these theoretical models are intuitive, and Moore (1998) finds
empirical evidence in favor of this substitution mechanism, these theories suffer some
theoretical shortcomings that cast doubts on these empirical findings. First, Lich-
abch and Beissinger ignore the fact that the state authorities and the dissidents are
limited to organizational resources, so due to the resource limitations, they cannot
consistently switch their strategies frequently enough to react to the rival actor’s
actions.
Cunningham and Beaulieu (2010), for example, find that this substitution effect
holds only if the state implements its repression policies consistently. Otherwise, the
dissidents receive noisy signals from the state, and they cannot choose their actions
accordingly. In fact, the repression of violent protests decreases the risk of dissident
violence, only if the state has (i) the capability of switching between different policing
and security strategies, (ii) the capacity of punishing violent behavior effectively, and
(iii) the adequate patience with non-violent activities. All of these features are mainly
related to the organizational features of the security forces. No doubt, the capability
of the opposition movement also affects this substitution effect, which will be focused
upon once more later in this piece.
Second, this substitution effect theory fails to explain why some of the politi-
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cal movements, such as Indian Independence and Civil Rights movements, remain
nonviolent while state officials used their coercive power to control the dissent. In
fact, while it is intuitive to argue that suppressing nonviolent protests can radicalize
the protesters, there are several successful cases that the opposition groups decide
not to play a game, resorting to violence, in which the state often has the upper
hand. In fact, the substitution models, specifically Lichbach (1987), only focus on
a subset of rational actors, whose utility function is trans-log, also known as the
Cobb-Douglas.3 In this functional form, the rate of substitution between the inputs
of function, here violent and nonviolent activities, changes strictly and continuously,
so for any combinations of dissent cost that the state imposes on the dissidents’ de-
cisions, the dissidents react by substituting their methods of resistance accordingly.
However, the rate of substitutions between the violent and nonviolent activities can
be zero, i.e. Leontief or perfect complementary functional form,4 or constant, i.e.
linear or perfect substitution functional form.5
The hypotheses on the substitution of repression and dissent strategies, therefore,
are not derived from the endogenous interactions between the state authorities and
the dissidents, but they are imposed exogenously into the model. Concluding that
a rational actor substitutes its strategies by assuming that this actor’s preferences
represent substitutive effects is not informative. In fact if we replace, for instance,
Lichbach’s cost function with a Leontief function, the very same model implies that
the dissidents do not resort to violence in response to the use of violence the state
3F (x; y) = log(x) + log(y);x; y 2 R+ and 0 < ;  < 1.
4F (x; y) = minx; y;x; y 2 R+ and 0 < ;  < 1
5F (x; y) = x+ y;x; y 2 R+ and 0 < ;  < 1
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authorities against the nonviolent protests. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation,
I develop a formal model that allows an inter-temporal dependency between adopted
strategies over time, and I find that the theoretical results of the substitution models
do not hold.
1.1.2 Political institutions and political violence
If suppressing social movements increases the likelihood of resorting to violence
by dissidents, then any social institutions that limit the suppression of opposition
movements can reduce the probability of dissident violence. For example, Henderson
(1991) , Poe and Tate (1994), and Davenport (1996) find a negative association
between democracy and repression. Democratic states, therefore, are less likely to
fuel violent rebellions by repressing nonviolent movements. In addition to regime
type, state capacity in employing discriminate repression and concession affects the
repression policy of the state. Shadmehr and Haschke (2016), for instance, show that
states decide between repression and concession policies based on their abilities in
targeting these policies.
Democratic institutions can also decrease the likelihood of dissident violence
through offering elections as an option for resolving political conflict. In fact, while
discontented citizens have access to the ballot box to change the status quo, chal-
lengers in non-democratic regimes, for achieving their goals, are limited to contentious
politics, i.e. nonviolent and violent resistance. However, some scholars discuss that
this does not mean authoritarian regimes necessarily are more prone to violent move-
ments. Tilly (2003) and Tilly and Tarrow (2006) argue that the effect of regime type
on social movement should be studied in interaction with state capacity. The devel-
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oped hypothesis by this theoretical framework predicts a high probability of armed
mobilizations only in authoritarian regimes with low state capacity, such as Sudan,
while authoritarian regimes with high state capacity, such as China, are immune from
political violence. In fact, military capability of strong states, both democratic and
non-democratic, increases the cost of taking up arms against the state, and that is
why we should not expect an armed uprising in these countries.
Although it is hard for citizens to organize even nonviolent protests in
authoritarian-high capacity states, discontented citizens in democratic states usually
have enough freedom to organize nonviolent protests.6 However, the empirical evi-
dence for this argument is ambiguous. Asal et al. (2013) find that democracy and
protest/public demonstration are positively associated in the Middle East while the
empirical analysis of self-determination movements by K. G. Cunningham (2013)
shows that democracy decreases the probability of both nonviolent campaigns and
civil wars.
Democracies offer more opportunities to the dissatisfied citizens for having a voice
and contribute in the political process, yet Crenshaw (1981); Eubank and Weinberg
(2001) claim that these opportunities and freedom make launching terrorist attacks
easier. As an empirical test of this hypothesis, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find a
positive, but statistically insignificant, association between democracy and the num-
ber of terrorist attacks. Here, we face a question similar to our main question in this
study: why does a discontented group in a democratic state choose terrorist attacks
over nonviolent activities to reach its desired goals? As discussed at the end of this
chapter and following theoretical chapters, one set of possible answers to this question
are offered through studying the organizational features of social movements.
6Roberts and Ash 2009; Schock 2004; Saxton and Benson 2006
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1.1.3 State-dissident interactions and foreign actors
The interactions between governments and dissidents during civil conflicts do not
happen in isolation. The world politics and foreign actors can affect the dynamics
of the conflicts in different ways. Skocpol (1979) in her social revolution theory
explains that competition with foreign rivals can exhaust a state’s military capacity,
and this makes an armed uprising against the state more desirable for the oppositions
of the state. In other words, when the probability of winning a violent confrontation
increases due to the military weakness of the rival, the expected benefit of choosing
armed conflict increases.
The foreign rivals of the state also can increase the risk of a violent civil conflict
through providing military and financial for the dissent. (Roberts and Ash 2009).
Furthermore, if the civil conflict threatens the benefits of foreign states or endangers
the ‘international order,’ some of the foreign actors may take military actions to settle
the conflict and contain it quickly. For example, during the 2011 unrests in Libya,
some of the western countries such as France, Britain, and the United States directly
supported opposition groups against Muammar Al-Qaddafi through providing mili-
tary supports and launching aerial strikes. Although it seems that these interventions
aim to assist the dissidents in their confrontations with the state authorities who use
violence to control the dissent, these foreign interventions can increase political vio-
lence and escalate the conflict.
In addition to the foreign states, the transnational diaspora can increase the risk
of political violence through making financial and military contributions to their co-
ethnic or co-religious groups. Fair (2005) argues that the diaspora usually benefits
the liberal democratic environment of their host states to affect the conflict processes
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in their home state. She finds that whether the members of the diaspora were part
of an armed group in their home country affects their decision between supporting
violent and nonviolent tactics. In addition, if the diaspora has a perception that
the violent campaigns are more efficient, its members would be more in favor of the
violent strategies, as they are protected against the adverse consequences of political
violence in their home country. Thus, they support the groups that adopted the
violent tactics, and this increases the risk and severity of political violence.
Unlike the violent conflict literature, nonviolent scholars mostly concentrated on
the foreign factors can help the dissidents to remain committed to the nonviolent
methods of resistance. Thus, the foreign interventions are expected to decrease polit-
ical violence during civil conflicts. For example, Karakaya (2016) finds that globaliza-
tion increases the likelihood of using the nonviolent tactics over the violent activities.
In another study, Gallo-Cruz (2012) explores the interaction between the interna-
tional nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and local nonviolent movements in
promoting and supporting the nonviolence resistance. The author argues that the
global discourse about the nonviolent movements lead to the provision of interna-
tional support for them, and this support improves the quality and quantity of the
international resources for the local nonviolent movements.
This is consistent with Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017)’s discussion of applying
the resource mobilization theory7 to explain how the different types of domestic and
foreign resources shape the decision of a political movement between the violent
and nonviolent tactics. The existence of a local or regional nonviolent organization
increases awareness about the movement and how the state is responding to the
dissent. Thus, it is more likely that the foreign states and the international community
7McCarthy and Zald 1977
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increase external pressure on the state via imposing economic sanctions (Chenoweth
and Stephan 2012). Thus, it is claimed that these types of foreign supports improve
the effectiveness of the nonviolent tactics vis-à-vis the violent actions.
Despite the problems that the foreign interventions can cause, their effects on the
dynamics of dissent-repression are understudied (Davenport 2007). In Chapter 3, I
develop several theoretical hypotheses to explore how foreign interventions can affect
authorities’ and dissidents’ behavior.
1.1.4 The indivisibility issue and violence as the last resort
The dissatisfied citizens in society want to change the status quo, so they plan
to put pressure on the authorities to achieve their political goals. In addition to the
above mechanisms and factors, the type of contentious policies can affect the dynamics
of state violence and dissident violence. Fearon (1995) introduces the indivisibility
of issues as one of three main sources of bargaining failure, and so war. This is
consistent with theories that claim unresolved political conflicts are more prone to
political violence since they cause anger and frustration.8 In fact, if the adversaries
fail to settle their disagreements, both sides of the bargaining are more likely to use
violence due to the anger and the frustration caused by the passage of time.
One of the main examples of the indivisibility problem is territorial conflict,9
especially when either side of the conflict attaches a symbolic value to the disputed
8Gurr 1971
9Gurr 1971; Beissinger 1998; Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002
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land.10 In other words, the cause of the bargaining failure here is not the asymmetric
information about the capability of each side of the conflict, but the indivisibility issue
shrinks the bargaining range into two degenerated points, i.e. nothing or all. Thus,
even if the discontented group first may give a chance to the nonviolent tactics to put
pressure on the state, the indivisibility issue makes reaching an agreement unlikely.
Failure in settling the disagreement through the methods of resistance proves the
extremists plan that the only solution to the problem is resorting to violence.
1.1.5 The recruitment of discontented citizens and dissent violence
During civil conflict, the state and the dissidents compete for the support of the
citizens. The masses decide between remaining aloof and supporting either the state
or the dissent. In fact, as Moore and Jaggers (1990) explain, the citizens receive an
offer/appeal from the state authorities and the dissidents to join and support them
during the conflict. Gates (2002) discusses the organizational aspects of the rebel
recruitment and explains how the characteristics of the citizens affect the content of
contracts that they receive from the state and the opposition groups.
For instance, if a civilian’s ideology is close to the ideology of the opposition
movement, then she or he needs a lower financial incentive to join the dissent. While
recruiting the new members using the ideological associations requires a lower level
of financial resources, the oppositions groups that do not have these types of social
ties to the citizens need a larger amount of financial resources to recruit. Thus, the
failure in collecting the required financial resources can lead to serious problems for
10Manekin, Grossman, and Mitts 2015
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the latter movements. Since it is argued that ‘power is in numbers’,11 the political
groups that cannot recruit enough number of members are more prone to use violence
as the method of resistance. In the second chapter, I discuss this process in detail.
The collective action theory is one of the core elements in explaining under which
conditions the discontented individuals join the dissent (Olson 1965). Although the
logic of the free-riding is intuitive and reasonable, we have seen many societies that
overcame their collective action problem and revolted against the state. The question,
therefore, is how the opposition groups can resolve the free-riding problem. Olson
suggests that offering private incentives is one of the solutions for overcoming the
collective action problem.12
Some opposition groups provide club goods for their members to encourage the
discontented civilians to join their opposition movement, but the types of these pri-
vate incentives can affect the quality and quantity of dissident violence. For example,
it is well-accepted in the conflict literature that offering looting opportunities is one
of the compensation methods used by rebel groups to recruit new members.13 The
permission of looting by the group’s leaders itself can be perceived by the members of
the group as a permission to use their coercive force since the civilians or the govern-
ment officials do not voluntary give up their belongings. Based on this mechanism, we
11DeNardo 1985; Arendt 1970
12For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the proposed solutions to the collective action
problem see Moore (1995)
13For example, see Lichbach (1994); Lichbach (1998); Humphreys (2005); Azam (2002); Wood
(2014);Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Gates (2002)
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should expect a higher risk of dissident violence in conflicts in which the opposition
groups do not have adequate financial resources and ideological incentives.14
In addition to the above mechanisms, political movements can use the methods
of resistance as an incentive for their recruitment purpose. While Chenoweth and
Stephan (2012) claim that nonviolent methods of resistance are more effective for
recruiting new members due to the lower participation cost of these methods, the
possibility of using violence also can be attractive to those individuals who believe in
the effectiveness of violence or psychologically may enjoy the activities that involve
violent actions. For example, there are several journalist reports on how the ISIS relied
on advertising the violent and brutal tactics as one of its recruitment strategies.15
Thus, the distribution of citizens characteristics can affect the level of violence
during a conflict; however, the literature of political conflict has not adequately and
explicitly discussed how the civilians, as the potential members of the opposition
groups, affect the dynamics of dissent-repression. Pearlman (2011) is one of few
studies that highlight the role of civilians during civil conflicts. In her composite-actor
approach, she disaggregates a political movement into three clusters of actors with
similar objectives and resources16 to explain how the fragmentation of the movement
increases the probability of dissident violence. However, she barely discusses the
masses in the empirical section of the study, a comparative study of Palestinian
national movement.
14See Weinstein (2006) for a detailed discussion of the association between the financial resources
of rebel groups and rebellion violence.
15Stern and Berger (2015) report in the Guardian; Yan (2016) and Mullen (2015) in CNN.
16These three types of actors are the elites, the aspirants, and the masses.
14
1.1.6 Organizational features of opposition movements and political violence
Despite the unquestionable impact of the above factors on political violence during
civil conflicts, we cannot ignore the fact that dissident violence is directly committed
by the members of the opposition groups. For instance, although state repression
increases the likelihood of the dissident violence, it is not hard to find the political
movements in the history that remained committed to nonviolent methods of resis-
tance regardless of the severity and brutality of state repression. Thus, to explain
the variations in the dissident violence, we need to study the dissent and its interac-
tions with the state authorities. Any theory that claims to explain political violence
should clarify through which mechanisms the interactions between the state and the
dissidents resulted to the violent behavior, and other factors, especially structural
ones, should be peripheral to these interactions. That is likely why a significant part
of the literature is dedicated to clarifying mechanisms that link the characteristics of
the opposition groups to the use of violence by the dissidents.
Before discussing these organizational factors and mechanism, it would be helpful
to review the rational and irrational theories of political violence. This helps me to
clarify the position of this project in the literature and its point of view about the
application of rational choice models in studying political violence. Although I build
the theoretical arguments in the second and third chapters of this dissertation on the
rational choice axioms, I also make theoretical discussion of situations that they can
be violated and lead to different results. Interestingly, I find empirical support for
these hypotheses.
Scholars employed irrationality in different ways to reject why rational choice
models fail to explain dissident violence. These theories mainly criticized either the
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choice-related assumptions or the rationality-related assumptions. Le Bon (1898) and
Sighele (1890) are among the first sociologists who tried to reject Hobbes’s rational
model of civil violence and formulate it as an irrational behavior through offering
crowd theory. Based on this theory, the members of a group are impulsive, irrational,
and incapable of judgment because the formation of the group boosts everyone’s
perceived power due to synergy. In fact, while individuals had to follow the rules
of society, becoming a member of the group lets them be less scared of the coercive
power of the state, so they are more likely to resort to violence.
This explanation is one of the arguments that fallaciously attach normative val-
ues to the rationality assumption. A rationalized action in the rational choice theory
means neither it is righteous nor it is wise, but it is developed on two axiomatic
assumptions, completeness17 and transitivity,18 about an individual’s choice set. No
doubt, these assumptions can be problematic in some cases, such as Arrow’s Impossi-
bility Theorem in which the cyclical preferences can violate the transitivity assump-
tion at the aggregate level; however, the irrational theories of civil violence should
explain how these types of violations of assumptions lead to the rejection of the
rational theories.
Excitement is another discussed reason for the irrational behavior of individuals
in a group. Undoubtedly, emotional actions such as excitement, anger, retaliation,
and so forth can increase the possibility of spontaneous reactions, and this means
the violation of the rational choice assumptions due to violating the ability of the
individuals in making a choice. In fact, an emotional individual does not evaluate
17This means for any two options X and Y , and individual can prefer X to Y , Y to X, or be
indifferent between them.
18This means if an individual prefers X to Y , and Y to Z, then she or he should prefer X to Z.
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its options, but s/he responds spontaneously. While this theory of political violence
based on the dissidents’ emotional reactions is intuitive, it raises several questions.
Individuals do not remain in their emotional phase for a long-term, so this theoretical
argument cannot explain the systematic use of violence as a method of resistance and
strategic plans for disrupting the state authorities’ control over the country.
On July 15, 2009, millions of people participated in a silent march in Tehran, the
capital of Iran, in reaction to the results of presidential. While the security forces
did not use coercive forces, and the protesters were ready to end the peaceful march
after several hours, a group of the protesters attacked a Besiege base,19 and this led
to the death of seven people. The question is what can explain this violent attack
to the military base. Clearly, all the protesters were experiencing a high level of
emotions due to the shock of election results and the attacks of the militia forces to
the dorms of Tehran University in the last night. However, why only a small group of
these protesters attacked the military base at the end of protest while as the biggest
anti-government demonstration in the history of Islamic Republic, the silent march
itself was a key success for the protesters?
A Newsweek reporter, Maziar Bahari who posted the video of this attack on the
Internet, later claimed in his biography book20 that the members of Mojahedin-E-
Khalq (MEK), a military opposition of the government, were responsible for this
occurrence. In fact, this was a spoiling nonviolent action of the protesters by the
members of an extremist group. Afterward, the protests continued for months in
Iran, yet never protesters attacked the police, the anti-riot forces, and the state
19Besiege is a militia force under the command of Islamic Revolution Guards. This force has
bases in almost all of the mosques and government organizations.
20 Then They Came for Me: A Family’s Story of Love, Captivity, and Survival
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properties, except in handful cases, such that the Iranian Green Movement is known
as a nonviolent movement.
In fact, after July 15, the leaders of the movement in their letters cautioned the
people that this movement should be protected from the violent actions as a result
of either emotional reactions or spoilers’ interventions. Returning to the excitement
argument, the main question is why Iranian Green movement and other similar non-
violent movements can remain mainly nonviolent despite all emotional challenges. At
best, this excitement argument can only explain chaotic and short-term episodes of
dissident violence since a nonviolent movement with enough capability can minimize
these undesirable actions. I will return to this argument in the second chapter as one
of my explanation of dissident violence.
In Human Action, Mises (1949) approaches to the rationality axioms in studying
human behavior from an epistemological point of view. Based on his argument, an
individual makes a rational decision on idiosyncratic a priori grounds; so, the ratio-
nality axioms are not falsifiable, and attempts for testing them do not add any values
to our understanding of the humans’ behavior. In fact, this argument underlines the
fact that finding a contradictory case does not reject rational choice approach.
For instance, assume that a model built on the rational choice axioms predicts
that the rational dissidents should prefer the civil resistance to the violent resistance.
Then, the existence of a group of individuals who resort to violence in the real world
is not necessarily proof against the rationality assumptions. The participants of a
movement are not identical, and they are different in their goals, resources, patience,
and preferences. It is simply possible that a group of individuals resort to violence
because their object, instead of putting pressure on the state, is escalating the conflict
to an armed conflict. Here, the homogeneity assumption besides assuming that all
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individuals prefer a change in status quo to the violence leads to a low explanatory
power for the above rational choice model. However, this problem is not necessarily
related to the rational choice models, but it is a failure in offering a reliable model
for studying adopted strategies by the dissidents.
In a rational choice framework, the dissident violence can be a puzzle. First,
the dissidents often have a lower military capacity relative to the state. Second,
the recent findings by the nonviolent scholars (Chenoweth) show that the nonviolent
campaigns are twice more successful than the violent campaigns. Considering these
two arguments, why do the dissidents resort to violence in their conformations with
the state?
Some scholars claim that ideological groups are more likely to resort to violence.
Drake (1998) argues that ideology provides a moral framework for an opposition
group to justify using violence against its opponents. Beardsley (2008) discusses
that the lethalness of some terrorist groups to its members’ perception of the violent
acts as a divine and sacred duty. Laqueur (2000) and Lesser et al. (1999) also find
that the ideologies of the new terrorist groups are lenient with the violent acts, so
they are deadlier than their predecessors. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) explain that
to study whether the ideology of political groups is lethal, we should focus on two
characteristics of these groups: First, who is the audiences of the group’s ideology,
and second, whether the group can clearly and cleanly delimit others.
Although these arguments help us to have a better understanding of political vi-
olence, they cannot be considered as the central arguments for explaining why an
opposition movement resort to violence. We easily can find many cases that the re-
ligious and ideological groups behaved differently in using violence as a method of
resistance. For example, in Iran before the 1979 Revolution, while Ayatollah Khome-
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ini chose civil resistance, Fada’iyan-e Islam, meaning the Devotees of Islam, adopted
violent strategies such as the assassination of the politicians and intellectuals. Both
Ayatollah Khomeini and Navab Safavi, the leader of Fada’iyan-e Islam, were religious
students in the city of Qom, and they received similar training in Shi’ia theology. Sim-
ilarly, before the 1979 Revolution, two leftist opposition groups in Iran contested the
constitutional monarchy system. While Tudeh party remained a nonviolent organiza-
tion despite the state’s severe repression, Fada’iyan-e-Khalq, meaning the Devotees of
the people, formed a guerrilla organization and attacked the military and non-military
targets affiliated to the state. These two cases before the 1979 Revolution in Iran
show that the ideology and religiosity of opposition groups cannot be the main factor
in the decisions of the opposition movements between the methods of resistance.
In fact, the religiosity and ideology of the dissatisfied citizens can be considered as
the available resources that the opposition movements use as instruments to legitimize
and attract the citizens’ support for their methods of resistance, either violent or
nonviolent. For example, Martin Luther King, Jr., in his autobiography, writes that
before reading Gandhi,
I had about to conclude that the ethics of Jesus were only effective in indi-
vidual relationships. The ‘turn the other cheek’ philosophy and the ‘love
your enemies’ philosophy were only valid, I felt, when individuals were
in conflict with other individuals; when racial groups and nations were in
conflict a more realistic approach seemed necessary. (Carson 20011:23-24)
Thus, when King was younger and unfamiliar with the civil resistance, he thought
that the violent political actions are inevitable in inter-group conflicts. Even he
convinced himself that two peaceful beliefs of Christianity, ‘turn the other cheek’ and
‘love your enemies’, do not apply to the inter-group conflicts.
Wink (1987) in Jesus’s Third Way: Violence and NonViolence in South Africa
explains that Jesus’s teaching such as “turn the other cheek” was not a passive re-
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action to Roman authorities in Jerusalem, but it was a moral and political jujitsu.
While Jesus’s ‘turn the other cheek’ and ‘love your enemies’ interpreted by young
Martin Luther King and Wink respectively as the passive reactions to and the nonvi-
olent resistance against the Roman authorities, we can find armed Christian groups21
adopting violent methods of resistance. Considering the diversity in the adopted
methods of resistances across religious and ideological movements, we can question
the role of these factors as the main determinants of dissident violence.
While McCarthy and Zald (1977)’s ‘resource model’ is silent about how the orga-
nizational resources affect an opposition group’s decision between violent and nonvio-
lent methods of resistance, differentiating between the different types of the resources
can be helpful for explaining dissident violence. Beissinger (1998) argues that quality
and quantity of weaponry used by groups explain the rise in the dissident violence
during the breakup of the USSR. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) also discuss the role of
territorial control and land shape in rebellion violence such the harsh terrains increase
the risk of violent events.
The role of group size as one of the main resources for political movements, es-
pecially the nonviolent ones, also is discussed in the literature. Beissinger (1998),
Enders and Sandler (2000), Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), Boyns and Ballard (2004)
argue that an increase in the size of the opposition group raises the level of dissident
violence; however, these studies mostly focused on the military groups, and they do
not discuss how the size of opposition groups influence their decision about moving
from the nonviolent phase to the violent phase. A group of scholars,22 on the other
21For example, Eastern Lightning, The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the National Liber-
ation Front of Tripura respectively in China, Uganda, and India
22For example, see DeNardo (1985), Della Porta and Tarrow (1986), Wood (2010), Kalyvas (1999);
Kalyvas (2006); Lichbach (1994); Bueno de Mesquita (2013).
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hand, show that there is a negative association between the size of opposition groups
and dissident violence.
For instance, Wood (2010) finds that insurgent groups use violence as an alterna-
tive to cope with their capacity loss, measured with the relative size of the troops.
DeNardo (1985) similarly discusses that if an opposition group fails to mobilize an ad-
equate number of dissatisfied citizens, then the group substitutes the gap between the
required and the realized number of participants with violence to achieve its targeted
level of disruption against the state. Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) and S. Tarrow
(1993) also use a similar argument to show that the exhaustion of movement increases
the likelihood of civil violence. The elites of the opposition group have two options
to response a decrease the size of the movement due to the exhaustion: first, compro-
mising on the dispute with the state via requesting more moderate policy changes,
and second, supporting violent and military actions to survive the movement without
changing their first targeted policy change. Although the former option is a peaceful
reaction, it polarizes the movement between moderates and extremists and makes the
extremists disappointed about the efficiency of the nonviolent strategies. Thus, this
pushes them toward violent methods of resistance.
In the second chapter, I argue that this static view about the decision of the
opposition movements between the violent and nonviolent strategies is empirically
and theoretically problematic. First, we cannot find robust empirical support in
favor of a negative association between a decrease in the movement size and resorting
to violence. Second, if we assume that opposition movements are rational actors,
as assumed in the above theories, why should these movements decide about the
methods of resistance only based on their current period information and ignore what
happened in the past and what would happen in the future given their current method
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of resistance. Assume that a movement has been recruiting successfully in the several
previous periods, yet due to severe state repression, the size of the movement shrinks
significantly at time t, should we conclude that this movement resorts to violence
once experiences a decrease in its size for only one period? Should we expect that
this group in response to the decrease in its size behaves like a group with a history
of unsuccessful recruitments in the previous periods?
Conditional on a priori grounds and formed expectations about the future, an
opposition movement should deal with a trade-off between the benefits of causing
more disruption using violence in the current period and the adverse consequences
of using violence in the current period in the future. DeNardo (1985) introduces two
types of violence costs: first, the logistic cost of generating violence, and second the
legitimacy cost of using violence. Although deNardo discusses the aforementioned
trade-off, his static model fails to explain in which period, a nonviolent movement
decides to resort to violence since in his model, actors are memoryless, and there is
not any difference between time t and t + 1. In fact, either the benefits of violence
overcome its costs at time t, and the movement is violent in every period, or the cost
of using violence is larger than its benefits, and the movement is nonviolent in every
period. Thus, in deNardo’s model, all variations in the adopted violent and nonviolent
strategies by the opposition movements can be explained only using exogenous shocks
to the model. In other words, studying the dynamics of the interactions between the
state and the dissidents over time in deNardo’s model does not help us to explain
the temporal variations in observed dissident violence. This problem is not limited
to deNardo’s model, and all social movements’ theories such as the ‘ contentious
23
cycle’ theories23 that ignore the inter-temporal associations between the movement’s
decisions over time suffer from this problem.
Moreover, the size of the opposition movement in deNardo’s model and the ‘con-
tentious cycle’ theories changes exogenously. In fact, most of the studies in the
literate of civil violence overlook how a movement’s behavior in each period affects
its current and future capabilities. Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) argue that the
nonviolent movements have a better chance to overcome their collective action prob-
lem and can recruit more members due to the lower participation cost of the civil
resistance. The authors find that the nonviolent movements have a higher success
rate because of a relatively larger participation size; however, they do not discuss how
the variations in the size of the opposition campaigns in their theory are associated
with the adopted methods of resistance by them.
Pearlman (2011) develops an organizational mediation theory to explain how relax-
ing the group homogeneity assumption can improve our understanding of the behav-
iors of social movements. This theory suggests decomposing an opposition movement
into smaller components, i.e. groups, and studying their interactions, for this ap-
proach gives us a better grasp of the cohesion and fragmentation of social movements.
Pearlman’s organizational mediation theory predicts that the cohesion of opposition
movements increases the likelihood of using nonviolent methods, while fragmented
movements are more prone to use violence in their confrontation against governments.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2012), Ackerman and Kruegler (1993), and Ackerman and
Rodal (2008) argue that organizational strength such as leadership, diversity in partic-
ipants, and reliable communication resources are required for a successful nonviolent
movement. A group with strong organizational structure is agile and can adopt the
23S. Tarrow 1993
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best strategies in reaction to its opponent(s). Furthermore, a cohesive movement can
monitor its components and members to punish the deviations from the movement’s
strategies, and to protect the movement from spoilers.
Although this monitoring and punishment capacity can help a civil campaign to
remain nonviolent, it requires planning and allocating organizational resources. In
fact, when the size a movement increases, there are more human resources available to
be used for the dissent, but this increase in the human resources can cause some prob-
lems. The principal-agent problem here can cause two problems. The first one is the
failure in screening new members, such that the spoilers, the rival groups’ members,
the state’s security forces, or the criminals, can join the movement, participate in
the protests, and undermine its goals and plans as a nonviolent movement. Second,
considering that during a conflict, especially when the state uses repression, dissi-
dents may show emotional reactions, or spoilers can derail the nonviolent protests,
the leaders of the group should be prepared to minimize the emotional behavior that
can lead to dissident violence. A movement with strong organizational structure can
minimize deviations from its strategies and plans even if it does not have an effective
screening mechanism.
Here, we can highlight another reason for studying the dynamics of changes in the
size of oppositions movements. While the literature claims that an increase in the size
of opposition movements decreases the risk of dissident violence, a significantly large
change in the size of these movements also can increase the risk of dissident violence if
the group is not prepared to monitor these new members and punish the deviations.
Therefore, in addition to studying how the size of the opposition movements can
affect the dissidents’ behavior, we need to discuss the quality of changes in the size
of the movements.
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1.2 Plan of the Dissertation
In this chapter, I discussed the determinants of political violence during civil con-
flicts by reviewing and discussing scholarly studies from different subfields of political
science as well as other fields of social science such as sociology and economics. I iden-
tified several gaps in the literature that require more investigation so that we can have
a better understanding of the determinants of the dissent-repression nexus. I offer
three dynamic models of state-dissident interactions in the following chapters of this
dissertation to explain not only why but also when these political actors resort to vi-
olence to achieve their political goals. Furthermore, I do not use structural variables
that do not change in the short-term to study the dynamics of political violence; the
theoretical implications of my theoretical models allow me to use the variables that
are the direct outcomes of the state-dissident interactions and change in every period.
Chapter 2 develops a theory of dissident violence to explain why opposition move-
ments do not resort to violence immediately in response to a negative change in their
size (DeNardo 1985; Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; S. Tarrow 1993) or state repres-
sion (Lichbach 1987). I also explore if any increases in the size of the opposition
movements decrease the risk of dissident violence. I introduce the idea of “balanced
growth” to suggest what types of changes in the size of the opposition movement are
associated with a lower risk of dissident violence.
In Chapter 3, I examine the effect of foreign interventions on the nexus of dissent-
repression. Similar to the previous chapter, I focus on the dynamics of the interactions
between the state and the dissidents, but here I add external actors to my model
to explore if the foreign interventions in favor of the dissidents can reduce state
repression, as it is claimed by politicians and political activists.
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Chapter 4 presents a formal model of the interactions between the state and the
dissidents. Since conducting social experiments for studying political movements is
either infeasible or too expensive, an option is using computational models to simulate
different scenarios and evaluate the explanatory power of our models. In this chapter,
I develop a recursive dynamic model, and then building on this formal model, I offer
a computational model that helps us both develop and test new hypotheses.
I conclude this dissertation with summarizing my findings in Chapter 5 and map-
ping out directions for future research
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Chapter 2
MOBILIZATION, SURVIVAL, AND VIOLENCE
Why do some dissident movements adopt nonviolent methods of resistance while
others use violence to achieve their objectives? Is practicing nonviolent resistance a
tactical decision or an ethical commitment? The 1979 Revolution in Iran is recognized
as a successful nonviolent movement. It survived several major episodes of state
repression, but the movement was eventually successful in overthrowing the Shah of
Iran on February 11, 1979, following one year of civil resistance.24 Some might claim
that the movement remained nonviolent and that it finally succeeded because of the
revolutionaries’ ethical commitment to peace. However, the historical evidence shows
that the day after taking control of the state, the revolutionaries executed many
politicians, military officers, and economic elites affiliated with the Shah’s former
government by the order of revolutionary courts whose legitimacy has been called
into question.
If we claim that the revolutionaries adopted nonviolent methods of resistance
because of their moral commitment to peaceful politics, then it is necessary to answer
some prickly questions, such as how can the morality of a movement vanish on a whim?
On the other hand, if nonviolent resistance is a tactical move, then when is this tactic
preferred to violent resistance? And, how does this preference change over time?
Despite increased attention to nonviolent resistance by political conflict scholar-
ship,25 the determinants and dynamics of adopting violent versus nonviolent strategies
24I use the terms nonviolent resistance and civil resistance interchangeably.
25For example, see Chenoweth and Stephan 2012, K. G. Cunningham 2013, Asal et al. 2013,
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have not yet been studied adequately. The few studies in the literature that examine
the tactical choice of a dissident movement between violent and nonviolent strategies
mostly explore the influence of structural conditions, such as regime type, population,
and political instability (K. G. Cunningham 2013; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Cun-
ningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Although structural theories explain the conditions
under which a society is prone to violence, they fail to discuss through which mech-
anisms a dissident movement adopts violent tactics when nonviolent resistance is a
viable option.
This study offers a novel argument regarding how the dynamics of movement mo-
bilization and demobilization affect the tactical use of violent resistance vis–a–vis non-
violent resistance as an outcome of state-dissident interactions. DeNardo (1985) and
Lichbach (1987) provide two foundational and classic theories of dissident strategic
choice between violent and nonviolent resistance. The authors employ a static model
to explain how a movement evaluates violent tactics vis-a-vis nonviolent strategies.
Since these models are static, they reduces the analysis of state-dissidents interac-
tions to one period and discount how past and the expectation about future affect
these interactions and their outcomes. For instance, these classic strategic models
of contentious politics overlook the fact that the dissidents and the state interact
and engage in active learning of each other’s capabilities over time, so this process
changes the dissidents’ and the state’s evaluation of using violence. In other words,
based on DeNardo (1985), Lichbach (1987), and similar models, a movement resorts
to violence in response to any resource loss and/or state coercive repression without
Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik 2015, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, Cunningham, Dahl, and
Frugé 2017
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considering what happened in the past and what the expectation of the movement is
about the future.
I relax this assumption by offering a model in which the movement uses the
collected information from its past interactions with the state to gauge the relative
efficiency of nonviolent resistance, which in turn affects their tactical choice. I suggest
that as long as the patterns of popular mobilization keeps a nonviolent movement
optimistic about its future, the movement remains committed to nonviolent resistance,
despite experiencing obstacles such as state repression and temporary resource loss.
I also contend that dissident violence is not always the outcome of dissident move-
ments’ tactical decision. The recent literature on political violence and nonviolent
resistance maintains that dissident movements do not involve unitary actors (Wein-
stein 2006; Pearlman 2011). Indeed, nonviolent movements include radical, emotional,
and spoiler members who are prone to provoke violence on their own (Haines 1984;
Chenoweth and Schock 2015). Thus, the development of monitoring and sanction-
ing mechanisms is required to prevent these members from deviating from nonvio-
lent strategies. However, when a movement experiences a substantial expansion in
its participation size in a short period, it does not have sufficient time to develop
its monitoring and sanctioning capabilities proportionately to screen and train new
members and control existing members who are likely to resort to violence. Thus, I
show that while a gradual expansion in the size of the movement decreases dissident
violence, a sudden and large expansion in the size of the movement raises the risk of
violence.
I evaluate my theoretical findings about the effects of the dynamics of movement
mobilization on dissident violence by using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns
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and Outcomes 2.0 dataset (NAVCO 2.0)26 and Mass Demonstrations and Mass Vi-
olent Events in the Former USSR, 1987-992 (MDMV) dataset27. These empirical
results support my theoretical claims.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section II provides a literature review on the
causes of dissident violence during political conflict. Section III discusses the theo-
retical framework of the study and the proposed hypotheses. Section IV documents
the research design. The empirical results and their substantive interpretation are
discussed in Section V. Finally, section VI concludes the paper with a discussion of
this study’s implications and suggestions for possible future research.
2.1 Structural and behavioral explanation of dissent violence
Political conflict scholars28 have recently tried to bridge the gap between the
literature within the fields of security studies, conflict resolution, civil resistance, and
social movements. As one of their main contributions, these studies correctly argue
that the lack of political violence in society does not imply a lack of conflict. In
fact, unlike what was virtually a common practice in the intra-state political conflict
literature, grieved groups do not decide between remaining silent and taking up arms;
rather, they employ, or at least consider employing, civil resistance as a third way
26Chenoweth and Lewis 2013
27Beissinger 1998
28For example, see Chenoweth and Stephan 2012, Pearlman 2011, and Nepstad 2011
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of opposing the establishment29. Moreover, if we are interested in explaining the use
of violence by dissident movements, logical completeness necessitates describing why
they do not employ other strategies, such as conventional politics and nonviolent
methods of resistance30(DeNardo 1985 ).
Accepting the existence of nonviolent strategies as a method of resistance raises
interesting questions, and answering these questions can broaden our understanding
of political conflict in general and political violence in particular. In fact, dissident
violence can be a puzzling observation. Why do some dissident movements choose
violent tactics over nonviolent resistance despite having lower military capacity than
the state? Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2012) findings make this puzzle even more
complicated, as they find that civil resistance movements have a significantly higher
success rate in achieving their objectives than violent movements. Thus, why would
a dissident movement adopt an ineffective strategy?
To explain dissident violence, some studies have focused on state responses to
political dissent31, while others have emphasized the political and economic structures
and capabilities of the state32. The role of the foreign political environment and
29Even sovereign states, equipped with military capabilities, evaluate the possibility of achieving
their objectives through non-military options, such as third-party mediation and economic sanctions,
before taking military action.
30deNardo (1985) uses ‘logical completeness’ to address this logical and theoretical issue, but a
more specific term for this type of theoretical inconsistency is negation completeness or syntactically
completeness, which is discussed and coined by Kurt Gödel. See Heijenoort (2002) for a detailed
discussion of incompleteness theorems.
31For example, see Lichbach 1987, Moore 1998, and Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010
32For example, see Crenshaw 1981 Mason and Krane 1989, Henderson 1991, Poe and Tate 1994,
Davenport 1996, Eubank and Weinberg 2001, Tilly 2003, Tilly and Tarrow 2006, Asal and Rethe-
meyer 2008, and Shadmehr and Haschke 2016
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external actors in political violence is also investigated by social scientists 33 as well.
Some conflict scholars also underscore the characteristics of dissident movements that
make them more liable to employ violence34.
Despite the unquestionable impact of other factors, we cannot ignore the fact that
dissident violence is directly committed, as either rational or irrational behavior, by
the members of movements. As an illustration, while state repression can increase
the likelihood of dissident violence, there are some movements that have remained
nonviolent after experiencing even severe repression. This ability to remain nonviolent
is rooted in the particular traits of these movements that make such resilience a
feasible option. Thus, explaining the behavior of dissident movements should be the
core of any theory aiming to illuminate why dissidents resort to violence, and other
factors should be discussed in relation to the decisions and actions of the movement.
Scholarship on nonviolent resistance has mainly discussed the effectiveness of non-
violent movements and the diversity of nonviolent tactics35, but has largely ignored
whether and why dissident movements adopt nonviolent methods of resistance. The
literature of political conflict also mostly examines militarized and violent disputes,
and it has virtually overlooked the existence of nonviolent resistance and its relevance
to political violence. Nevertheless, political conflict scholars have initiated a new wave
33Skocpol 1979; Roberts and Ash 2009; Fair 2005; Gallo-Cruz 2012; Karakaya 2016
34Gurr 1971; Tilly 1978; Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; S. Tarrow 1993; S. G. Tarrow 1989; Mason
and Krane 1989; Drake 1998; Wood 2010, 2014; Pearlman 2011.
35For example, see Sharp (1973); Ackerman and Kruegler (1993); Nepstad (2011)
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of research and data collection efforts 36 in recent years to explain the tactical choice
of violent and nonviolent methods of resistance.
These studies, which primarily rely on structural factors, explore which political,
economic, demographic, and social factors contribute to the adoption of violent and
nonviolent tactics. However, despite their merits, these structural theories suffer
from several weaknesses and shortcomings. First, structural factors, such as political,
economic, and social deprivations, at best explain why individuals are dissatisfied
with the status quo, but they cannot help us understand how and when dissident
movements adopt violent and nonviolent tactics. Second, these factors often do not
fluctuate in the short term, so it is difficult to associate them with the quantity and
quality of violent incidents varying easily in the short term (Chenoweth and Ulfelder
2017). Finally, these structural models often focus on one actor, either the state or
the movement, and overlook the interactions between the two. However, as recent
studies of the dissident-repression nexus show (Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014; Ritter
and Conrad 2016), the state and movements are interdependent, and I also discuss
below how this interdependence changes as the conflict evolves over time. Thus,
overlooking these interactions can weaken the explanatory power of our theories.
Without discounting the importance of structural theories, we need to develop
strategic meso-level models to study how the interactions between the state and dis-
sident movements can influence the movements’ use of violent methods of resistance.
Such behavioral models can complement structural models and improve our under-
standing of dissident violence. DeNardo (1985) and Lichbach (1987) employ static
formal models to explain the adoption of nonviolent and violent methods of resis-
36For example, see Chenoweth and Stephan (2012), K. G. Cunningham (2013), Asal et al. (2013),
Braithwaite, Braithwaite, and Kucik (2015), Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017), Cunningham, Dahl,
and Frugé (2017)
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tance as an outcome of the interactions between the state and dissidents37. DeNardo
discusses that dissident movements cope with the deficiency of mass participation
by directing their human resources toward violent strategies. Consequently, if state
repression discourages mass participation, then the movement is more likely to resort
to violence.
Similarly, Lichbach argues that dissident movements substitute nonviolent strate-
gies with violent tactics in response to state repression. Although such theoretical
arguments are intuitive, it is not difficult to find the examples of dissident movements
that did not resort to violence after an episode of state repression and a decrease in
participation size (See Appendix I). In other words, these static strategic models fail
to explain why responses of dissident movements to state repression, as well as the
decreases in participation size, vary across time and movements.
The next part of this study discusses why the trade-off between violent and non-
violent resistance is not time invariant and how it can in fact change over time as
the state and dissident movements interact. Then, I explore how the dynamics of
movement mobilization and demobilization influence this trade-off, as well as the
movement’s tactical choices.
2.2 Mobilization, demobilization, and violence
Consider a society in which a group of citizens is discontented with the status
quo; however, change via democratic institutions is not an option owing to either a
lack of democracy or doubt about its efficiency. Discontented citizens, therefore, form
37Although these models explore the interactions between the state and the dissidents, they
assume that the state’s repression policy is exogenous. Pierskalla (2010) and Ritter (2014) are two
recent studies that endogenize state repression policy, too.
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a movement to compel the state to alter its current policies by causing disruptions
in the governance of society 38. Only when pressure on the state reaches a certain
level will the desired adjustments in policy be realized. This movement has two main
options to disrupt the government and put pressure on the state: violent methods of
resistance and nonviolent methods of resistance.
The term ‘violence’ is commonly used in the political violence literature, and ac-
tions such as murder and physical injury are unanimously considered violent behavior.
However, there is no consensus on whether using physical forces with lower intensity
or targeting non-human entities are considered violent. Following Tilly (1978), I
define violence as “any use of physical force” (174). Thus, any resistance tactics in-
volving physical force, no matter how powerful the physical force is, toward whom
or what it is applied, or whether it is applied with or without weapons, is considered
violent resistance. For example, damaging private or public buildings is an act of vio-
lent resistance, according to this definition. On the other hand, using harsh chants in
protests is not a violent act based on this definition even if it is morally problematic.
Consistent with the above definition of violence, nonviolent resistance includes all
tactics that do not require physical force (Sharp 1973). Thus, acts of disobedience,
noncooperation, disruption, persuasion, and so forth, to the extent that they do not
involve physical force, are regarded as nonviolent resistance, regardless of whether
they are legal. Traffic blockage, for example, is a nonviolent tactic, as long as it does
not entail damaging private and public properties, although unauthorized blockage
of roads is illegal in most countries.
38 Here, for simplicity, I assume that the movement already resolved its collective action problem.
Since discussing how movements overcome their collective action problem is not within the scope of
this study, I will study all movements that solved their collective action problem in the empirical
section.
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While both violent and nonviolent actions disrupt the governance of the state,
the intensity and the cost associated with these actions differ. Nonviolent movements
mainly rely on socio-economic actions to encourage people not to cooperate or obey
the state so that the government apparatus cannot function. On the other hand,
movements that use violent means of resistance disturb the functionality of the state
by employing physical forces in order to eliminate state officials or properties. For
instance, when workers of a state-owned oil refinery strike, they deprive the state
from of its financial resources. Alternatively, these workers could choose to destroy
the refinery in order to interrupt the income flow of this business. Both of these
actions contribute to disrupting the governance of the state. However, the latter is
more coercive and has a longer effect. 39.
If violent tactics are more disruptive, why do some dissident movements choose
nonviolent tactics? One might argue that supplying weapons, ammunition, and explo-
sive materials is costly. This is a valid point, but how difficult is it to actually equip
a movement with violent means? Finding stone, knife, and chemical materials is not
an impossible task. How complicated is it to make a Molotov Cocktail? Moreover,
owing to international and regional rivalries, it is not uncommon for foreign countries
to assist dissident movements in order to smuggle weapons into the country, similar
to what happened in Syria and Yemen.
No doubt, the cost of generating violence affects the movement’s decision regarding
whether to resort to violence. However, by shifting to violent tactics from nonviolent
strategies, the movement evolves into a different political actor, and the political
39We can assume that nonviolent movements are more disruptive ceteris paribus, but then dis-
cussing why the movements choose nonviolent tactics would be redundant. However, it would be
scientifically more interesting if we explain the underlying mechanisms through which the movements
choose nonviolent methods of resistance while violent tactics are more coercive.
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environment in which the movement interacts with the state significantly changes.
Furthermore, it is usually difficult to reverse this decision and de-escalate a conflict.
Thus, despite potentially favorable consequences, such as being more disruptive, the
movement should also address the negative consequences of resorting to violence.
Below, I explore four different consequence of dissident violence.
2.2.1 The adverse and favorable consequences of violent dissidents
As the first consequence, dissidents become more coercive and disruptive in re-
sorting to violence without mobilizing more people (Tilly 1978; DeNardo 1985; Della
Porta and Tarrow 1986). In fact, this argument for the substitution between dissident
violence and mass mobilization is discussed as the duality of power and violence in
Arendt (1970)’s essays on violence:
“[I]t is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same. Power
and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is
absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy[...]”(56).
Although using violence can discourage the mobilization of dissatisfied citizens,
discussed in detail below, the level of disruption caused by violent resistance can allow
the movement to parade its capabilities and undermine the state authority in keeping
order. This can signal that the state is vulnerable, and it bends to the people’s will
if the pressure is sufficient. Thus, resorting to violence can improve mobilization and
thus the chance of success, by showing the competence of the movement in confronting
the state.
The second favorable consequence of resorting to violence for a dissident movement
is the possibility of mass mobilization in response to severe and indiscriminate state
repression, known as backlash or backfire (Mason and Krane 1989; Rasler 1996; Kydd
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and Walter 2006; Francisco 2004; Sullivan and Davenport 2017). The effectiveness
and dynamics of state repression are ongoing debates in the literature (Davenport
2007). However, there is a consensus that inconsistent, indiscriminate, and exces-
sive state repression increases the risk of backlash (Mason and Krane 1989; Kydd
and Walter 2006; Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). Dissident movements therefore
have incentives to resort to violence in order to increase the repression and likely
target civilians in the confusion. Furthermore, repression is costly, and the state
does not maintain an infinite level of repression capability on hand (Koopmans 1993;
Shadmehr and Haschke 2016). Since violent resistance is more coercive and disrup-
tive than nonviolent resistance, it can exhaust the security forces further and make
it costlier for the state to repress violent dissidents. As the capability of the secu-
rity forces decreases, the risk of intentional and unintentional indiscriminate violence
grows (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006; kalyvas_how_2007), hence making it more
likely for state repression to backfire.
The two above mechanisms discuss the benefits of resorting to violence for a dissi-
dent movement. However, using violent means of resistance is also a costly strategy.
Although the state employs repression to demobilize both violent and nonviolent
movements, there is a consensus in the literature that violent resistance intensifies
state repression (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017). For example, Carey (2010)
and Conrad and Moore (2010) find that the resistance methods that involve violent
tactics increase the risk of state-sponsored violence. State repression, similar to vi-
olent resistance, applies physical forces that demobilize the movement via arresting,
injuring, torturing, and killing the movement members.
When a movement adopts violent tactics, the state becomes less concerned about
using violence and finds it more legitimate and justifiable to repress the violent move-
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ment. Members of a violent movement, therefore, tend to be repressed more severely
than members of a nonviolent movement. Since the members of movement are “the
richest source of power”40, the first direct adverse effect of state repression is the loss
of them owing to casualties. This consequence is more serious for violent movements,
as the state deploys a higher level of physical force against violent movements.
Another adverse effect of resorting to violence, which triggers the state’s coercive
responses, mainly affects the recruitment and defection processes. Chenoweth and
Stephan (2012) thoroughly discuss how a nonviolent movement, owing to its lower
physical, informational, and moral participation barriers, is more appealing than a
violent movement to discontented citizens; thus, nonviolent movements have a larger
participation size than violent movements. However, resorting to violence leads to
the attrition of the members who initially join a movement for its nonviolent strate-
gies. Discontented citizens who have hesitated to join a nonviolent resistance will
also certainly not incur the cost of violent participation. Thus, switching from civil
resistance to violent resistance can decrease the mobilization capacity and thus the
power of the movement.
Furthermore, one of the main mechanisms discussed in the literature on civil
resistance is that the repression of nonviolent movements can weaken the loyalty of
regime agents, diminish their support of the regime, and even trigger their defection
(Sharp and Schelling 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Nepstad 2011). Thus, when
a movement decides to resort to violence in order to coerce the military, political, and
economic elites of the country, it is highly unlikely that these elites will revoke their
support of the state and defect.
40Tse-tung 2011 p.260
40
2.2.2 Dynamics of (de)mobilization and resorting to violence
For any political movement, the major source of power is the people. Movements
relying on nonviolent resistance are even more dependent on the masses to put ade-
quate pressure on the state so that they can achieve their objectives. A handful of
people is sufficient to launch a terrorist attack. However, a sufficiently large number
of people is necessary to stage an effective strike41. Furthermore, popular mobilization
plays a decisive and essential role in the success of nonviolent movements(Chenoweth
and Stephan 2012; Nepstad 2011). Accordingly, if a nonviolent movement fails to
recruit enough people for an effective civil resistance, its members may doubt the
effectiveness of this method. In fact, as Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé (2017) dis-
cuss in detail, the members of dissident movements debate and evaluate the available
resistance strategies, and these discussions affect the coordinated resistance tactics.
Figure 1 summarizes the consequences of resorting to violence for a nonviolent
movement and their possible effects on the movement’s mobilization. When the move-
ment evaluates the use of violence as an alternative to nonviolent resistance, these
four mechanisms shape its evaluation. However, these mechanisms do not equally
affect the movement’s decision between violent and nonviolent means of resistance.
The dynamics of movement mobilization and demobilization contain important
information regarding the interactions between the state and movement. The state
does not evaluate the efficiency of its repression policy by interviewing citizens. It is
costly, time consuming, and even impossible to collect reliable information because of
41There have been hunger strikes historically that have resulted in mobilizing the masses. For
instance, the 1981 hunger strike of Irish republican prisoners is a good example. Nevertheless,
small strikes are nearly unlikely to be directly effective in changing the state’s policies, especially in
non-democratic regimes.
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Figure 1. Mechanisms linking violence to mobilization.
the possibility of preference falsification (Kuran 1989). The number of participants
and the type of resistance actions are the best measures for the state to assess the
movement and its response to the implemented repression policies. Similarly, the
movement can learn about its resilience to state repression by analyzing the partici-
pation size in a post-repression collective action plan.
As long as a nonviolent movement is expanding and optimistic about its successful
mobilization in the future, it is unlikely for the movement to resort to violence. In
fact, mass mobilization emboldens movements in believing that discontented citizens
are supportive of its causes and that they are ready to participate in the coordinated
nonviolent actions. Under these conditions, the movement does not find it justifiable
to suffer the adverse consequences of violent resistance, casualty and attrition, in
order to expand its popular support via magnifying the disruption and relying on the
backlash. Nevertheless, there are nonviolent movements that resort to violence, either
temporarily or permanently. Now, the question concerns what and how the relative
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influence of adverse and favorable consequences of violent resistance change in favor
of using violence.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) build their ‘selectorate theory’ on a simple but
powerful assumption: the first priority of a political leader is survival. In fact, to
benefit from power and wealth, political leaders need to maintain their political posi-
tion. However, this survival assumption is not only limited to the politicians who are
within the winning coalition. Any purposeful entity needs to survive in order to be
able to achieve its objectives and enjoy the outcomes of its efforts. Social movements
are no exception. A social movement can endeavor to alter the status quo only if it
is alive and if it can exert pressure on the state.
While the state plans and acts to kill dissident movements from the outside, the
demobilization of these movements also can occur from the inside (Davenport 2014).
Dissident movements can make appeals to discontented citizens in order to recruit
them, and in return, they commit to changing the status quo (Moore and Jaggers
1990; Gates 2002). However, participating in a movement is risky and time consuming,
and the members of the movement become frustrated with the loss of opportunities
and lack of progress in achieving their objectives (S. Tarrow 1993; Della Porta and
Tarrow 1986); Davenport 2014). Hence, besides recruiting the new members and
attracting domestic supports, the movement should keep an eye on the retention of
current members (Hirsch 1986, 1990), as a critical factor for first its survival and
ultimately its success.
The demobilization of a movement is a significant threat to its survival; hence, the
movement attempts to prevent its death by any means necessary, including violence.
When the movement experiences several continuous periods of decline in its size, it
becomes clear that the loss of members is not a temporary shock and that the plans
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and tactics of the movement failed. Even when the size of the movement remains
steady for several periods, members begin doubting the capability of the movement
in putting sufficient pressure on the state to bend its demands. The movement should
therefore expect that demobilization will be imminent should nothing change.
These casualty and attrition mechanisms prevent the movement from resorting
to violence as long as the movement successfully mobilizes the masses or as long
as it is optimistic about recruiting new members. However, if members are leav-
ing the movement—or if there is a high chance that they will leave should nothing
change—the adverse consequences of violent tactics carry lower weight in the move-
ment’s decision between violent and nonviolent methods of resistance. In fact, the
movement looks for tactics that can exhibit its disruptive power, the disruption mech-
anism, and that lead to mobilization. Since lowering the cost of participation through
adopting nonviolent strategies has not been successful, the movement considers the
backlash mechanism to mobilize the discontented individuals. Consequently, the risk
of demobilization and, in turn, threats to the survival of the movement can dilute
the strategic superiority of nonviolent resistance. The above arguments on how the
dynamics of mobilization and demobilization affect dissident violence are summarized
as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Dissident violence is more likely when the likelihood of movement
demobilization increases.
This hypothesis deviates from classic hypotheses regarding the association be-
tween movement size and the use of violence42 at least in two ways: First, a negative
change in the movement size over one period does not provide sufficient information
regarding whether the movement resorts to violence in order to cope with this re-
42Tilly 1978; Crenshaw 1981; DeNardo 1985;Lichbach 1987; Wood 2010
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source loss. The movement needs to observe a pattern of demobilization in order
to be convinced that the continuation of a nonviolent movement can threaten its
survival. Second, a movement does need to experience a decrease in its participation
size in order to become prone to radicalization; even if the movement fails to increase
its participation size, the risk of dissident violence increases as the movement expects
to experience the demobilization process soon.
While we assume above that a dissident movement is a unitary actor, recent
studies in the literature challenges this assumption. Pearlman’s (2011) theory of
organizational mediation relaxes the movement homogeneity assumption to explain
the effect of movement cohesion on the method of resistance. She argues that the
prevailing path to nonviolent protest is only available when the movement is cohesive.
Chenoweth and Schock (2015) also show that nonviolent movements usually have a
radical flank, whose role in the movement and relationships with the other groups
within the movement can change over time.
In fact, the homogeneity assumption of social movements is very far from what
occurs in the real world. Some members of a social movement are risk takers, and
they are more radical, so their preferred method of resistance is violent action over
nonviolent action (Haines 1984). Some members also cannot control their emotions, so
it is likely that they react to state repression violently (Rule 1989).Finally, every social
movement is prone to recruitment and accept spoilers who are either security agents
infiltrating the movement to radicalize it or thugs joining for looting opportunities.
While individuals constitute collective groups that augment their power and re-
sources to obtain jointly produced benefits, their egoism can imperil the collective
outcomes. Thus, these groups need to develop monitoring and sanctioning mecha-
nisms in order to minimize the risk of deviations from the established norms and
45
rules (Hechter 1995). Weinstein’s (2006) book explores the necessity of monitoring
and sanctioning mechanisms in rebel groups: Groups relying on economic endow-
ments are more prone to recruit ‘opportunistic’ members who are then more likely
to use violence in order to appropriate civilians’ belongings. In contrast, ideological
groups mostly include ‘activist’ members who believe in the causes of movement and
who pursue long-term ideological and political objectives, so they are less likely to
use violence because of materialistic incentives.
Thus, even if the movement decides to adopt nonviolent methods of resistance,
there are radical, emotional, and spoiler members within the movement who can
nevertheless provoke violence. Organized movements usually establish mechanisms
to screen new recruits, monitor members, and punish those who deviate from the
movements’ core strategies. For instance, evidence form the Civil Rights Movement
in the US shows that the members of this movement received training to remain
nonviolent when they participated in a protest (Cosgrove 2013). We can then expect
that a movement with appropriate and strong organizational capacity can alleviate
these unintended and spontaneous problem through monitoring and controlling its
members, as well as punishing deviants.
An implication of Hypothesis 1 is that a movement must expand over time to
remain committed to its nonviolent methods of resistance. However, not all types
of expansions guarantee nonviolence. A movement can increase its size gradually
over several periods. Alternatively, it can reach a large size owing to a sudden and
significant change in only one period. Although this sharp expansion increases the
power of the movement, the strategic necessity of resorting to violence decreases,
and this can challenge the screening, monitoring, and sanctioning capability of the
movement. A quick and substantial change in the size of a movement increases
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the risk of dissident violence, since the movement not only lacks sufficient time to
screen its new recruitments but also may not be able to develop adequate capacity
to monitor and, if required, punish deviant members. On the other hand, a gradual
increase in the size of a movement allows the movement to screen new recruitments
more thoroughly and to improve its ability to monitor and control capacity over time.
These considerations motivate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: While a gradual increase in the size of a movement decreases the
likelihood of resorting to violence, a large and rapid expansion of a movement raises
the risk of violent resistance.
2.3 Empirical analysis
I estimate a series of statistical models to test my hypotheses on the association be-
tween (de)mobilization dynamics and dissident violence. To do so, I use two datasets:
the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 2.0 dataset (NAVCO2.0)43 and
the Mass Demonstrations and Mass Violent Events in the Former USSR, 1987-1992
(MDMV) dataset44. The latter includes yearly data on nonviolent and violent cam-
paigns for the period between 1945 and 2006. NAVCO 2.0’s codebook defines “[...]
a campaign as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in
pursuit of a political objective.”(2)
MDMV is also an event database, containing information on 6,663 protest demon-
strations and 2,177 mass violent events across the entire territory of the former Soviet
Union from January 1987 through December 1992. Since NAVCO 2.0 is not limited
43Chenoweth and Lewis 2013
44Beissinger 1998
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to a geographic location or campaign, I use it to test the generalizability of the theo-
retical arguments. NAVCO has additionally been widely employed, and using it for
the empirical analysis aids in understanding how the results of this study are related
to other studies on violent and nonviolent movements.
However, NAVCO is an annual dataset and sets a relatively high threshold of
violent actions (discussed below) to code a campaign as violent. In contrast, MDMV
reports violent and nonviolent actions with details at the daily level. It also includes
information on the different levels of dissident violence, from physical property dam-
ages to lethal attacks. Thus, the empirical unit of analysis using MDMV is the
nationalist movement- day.
2.3.1 Violent dissidence in NAVCO 2.0
In the real world, it is difficult to find dissident movements that purely rely on
either violent or nonviolent tactics while entirely ignore the other one. Thus, coding
whether a movement is violent or nonviolent is challenging, particularly if the dataset
is aggregated temporally. NAVCO solves this coding problem by “characterizing
campaigns are ‘primarily nonviolent’ or ‘primarily violent’ based on the primacy of
resistance methods employed” (3). Thus, I use the year-campaign as the unit of
analysis, and following NAVCO’s coding, I code the categorical dependent variable
Violent as “1” if the primary method of resistance in a campaign year is violence and
“0” otherwise.
To measure demobilization risk, that is the independent variable, I use the number
of periods without a successful increase in the participation size. If a nonviolent
movement experiences an expansion in its size at time t, this cannot be interpreted
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as a failure to mobilize discontented individuals. In contrast, the periods in which
dissident movements undergo a decrease in their participation size or in which they
fail to expand are a sign of mobilization failure, it is intuitive that shrinkages in
a movement’s size can be a sign of demobilization. However, why periods where
participation size remains constant should be counted as a sign of demobilization
needs more discussion.
Dissident movements do not resort to violence unless they receive signals that the
end of the movement is approaching. Only at this point, using violence as a survival
strategy becomes a justified tactic. The failure in expanding the size of a movement
over several periods shows that the current level of pressure caused by the supporters
of the movement does not exert sufficient pressure to change the status. It also
shows that the movement has not been able to increase this pressure by recruiting
more people. These failures in effectively altering the status quo and recruiting new
members can cause the demobilization of the movement in near the future. For this
reason, when measuring the risk of demobilization, I include the numbers of periods
without an expansion.
I also include a panel of control variables in order to further insulate the estimated
coefficients from confounding effects. Contentious cycle and resource mobilization
models of dissident movements argue that any decreases in the movement size increase
the risk of dissident violence (Tilly 1977; Crenshaw 1981; DeNardo 1985; Della Porta
and Tarrow 1986; S. Tarrow 1993; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2014). Among these studies,
those that examine the rebel groups are not designed to study the transition from
violent strategies to violent tactics. In fact, they evaluate the association between
resource loss and the escalation of rebel violence. Studies on the use of violence by
nonviolent movements are also bivariate correlation analyses of a small number of
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cases. To evaluate these claims and control for their effects, I include the size of
campaigns and their positive and negative changes relative to the previous period as
control variables.
NAVCO 2.0 uses a categorical variable to code the relative size of campaigns as
“0”, “1”, “2”, and “3” in order to represent small (hundreds to thousands), medium
(tens of thousands), large (above one hundred thousand), and extremely large (above
one million) campaigns, respectively. Decrease and increase are binary variables that
are coded “1” if the estimated size of the campaign shifts to, respectively, a smaller
and larger category relative to the previous period. I separate positive and negative
changes as two different variables because, as shown later, they can have different
effects on the campaign’s method of resistance.
The literature on political violence also examines the effect of state repression
on the likelihood of dissident. The findings regarding this association are highly
inconsistent (See Davenport (2007) for a detailed discussion). While some scholars
find a positive association (Francisco 2004; Ritter 2014), some studies support a
negative association (Hibbs 1995). Some studies also find both effects (Muller 1985;
Rasler 1996; Moore 1998; Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). NAVCO 2.0 reports the
degree of state repression in response to campaign activity. I include this variable in
the estimated models and label it repression.
Moreover, the role of democratic institutions in pacifying political grievances has
frequently been discussed in the literature of political conflict (Hegre 2001; Vree-
land 2008; Hendrix and Haggard 2015), and it is known as ‘domestic democratic
peace’ (Davenport 2007). Therefore, I include in my model a categorical measure of
democracy by using polity2 from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).
Following the suggestion in Polity IV, regimes with a polity2 score of 6 and higher
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are coded as democratic, and the democracy variable is coded as“1” for these regimes
and “0” for others.
Some of the nonviolent campaigns have a radical flank, which can facilitate
and increase the likelihood of resorting to violence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012;
Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). The NAVCO dataset codes the existence of a radical
flank within dissident movements. To control for the effect of these political actors, I
include a radical variable in the estimated regression model. This variable takes the
value of “0” if the campaign is primarily violent, takes the value of “1” if the campaign
is nonviolent without a radical flank, and takes the value of “2” if the campaign is
nonviolent with a radical flank. Pearlman (2011) also underlines the role of organi-
zational cohesion on the adopted resistance tactics. I control for the degree of unity
among opposition groups within dissident movements by including a disorganization
measure from NAVCO 2.
Furthermore, I lag all of the independent and control variables because as dis-
cussed in the theoretical section, the tactical choice at time t is decided based on
the collected information up to the t   1. This procedure also decreases the risk of
heterogeneity owing to the possibility of a simultaneous effect between the method
of resistance and the risk of demobilization. Since the independent variable in this
study summarizes what happens over several past periods, it is difficult to argue that
the method of resistance at time t affects the dynamics of mobilization at t k where
k > 1 . Nevertheless, I use the lag of the independent variable to minimize the risk of
estimating a biased association owing to bidirectional effects between the dependent
and independent variables. The statistical summary of dependent, independent, and
control variables is reported in Table 1.
I estimate my regression models by using different methods. Although the depen-
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Table 1. Summary statistics of variables used in the NAVCO analysis
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Size 1,558 0.68 0.77 0.00 3.00
Disorganization 1,556 1.23 1.12 0.00 3.00
Radical flank 1,556 0.24 0.57 0.00 2.00
Goal 1,558 2.17 2.01 0.00 5.00
Repression 1,556 2.71 0.76 0.00 3.00
Size (increase) 1,558 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Size (decrease) 1,558 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Demobilization risk 1,558 5.84 6.92 0.00 38.00
Violent 1,558 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
Nonviolent years 1,558 0.30 1.09 0.00 10.00
Democracy 1,558 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
dent variable is a binary variable, I first estimate linear probability models (LPM) to
address possible concerns that are raised by some scholars about nonlinear probabil-
ity models (NLPM)(Angrist and Pischke 2009). Then, I estimate the same regression
models by using probit and logit methods. I also control for time effects by includ-
ing a year dummy variable. Fixed-effects models are also estimated to minimize the
adverse effects of the omitted variable problem for the estimated models. To control
for the possible problem of heteroskedasticity, I estimate robust standard errors.
Moreover, the methods of resistance can be affected by unknown, unobserved, and
unmeasured variables in each dissident movement, causing temporal correlation in the
resulting residuals. Thus, I cluster the standard errors by movements to mitigate this
problem. Finally, some might argue that past violent and nonviolent events can affect
the likelihood of resorting to violence in the current period. To control for this valid
concern, I add the lag of dependent variable, i.e., violent, to the estimated model in
the linear models. For the logit and probit models, I add the number of years without
violent dissidents, labeled nonviolent years, and its square and cube to the estimated
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model in order to control for temporal dependence, as suggested by Beck, Katz, and
Tucker 1998.
2.3.2 Violent dissidence in the USSR, 1987-1992
In this dataset, I study the use of violent and nonviolent tactics by the nation-
alist movements in the republics of the USSR between 1987 and 1992. This dataset
includes daily event data on contentious events. The unit of analysis is therefore the
nationalist movement-day. Unlike NAVCO 2.0, this dataset reports all violent attacks
on people or on the property caused by 15 or more persons.
The dependent variable, violent, is a binary variable that is coded “1” if the event
is violent and “0” otherwise. If both violent and nonviolent events are reported for one
day, I code that day as a violent day. The demobilization risk is calculated in exactly
the same method as is done for the analysis of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. Similar to
the empirical analysis of NAVCO dataset, I include participation size, as well as its
increase and decrease relative to the previous period, as control variables.
MDMV reports the degree of coercion by authorities at each confrontation between
the state and dissidents. I use the average of this variable per day to control for the
level of daily state repression. This variable is labeled repression. To control for time
trends, both month and year dummy variables are included in the estimated mod-
els. Fixed-effects models also are estimated in order to control for omitted variables.
Furthermore, as discussed in the analysis of the NAVCO dataset, heteroskedastic-
ity and serial correlations, which decrease the efficiency of the estimated coefficients,
should be expected in the quantitative study of conflict processes; thus, I estimate
robust standard errors and cluster them at the republic level to address these issues.
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Finally, since the dependent variable is binary, logit and probit models in addition
to linear probability models are estimated. The statistical summary of dependent,
independent, and control variables of the MDMV analysis is reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in the MDMV analysis
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Repression 5,004 0.186 0.601 0 4
Size(/100k) 5,004 0.167 0.698 0.001 18
Size (increase) 5,004 0.373 0.484 0 1
Size (decrease) 5,004 0.369 0.483 0 1
Demobilization risk 5,004 1.218 4.402 0 40.40
Nonviolent days(/30) 5,004 4.562 8.027 0 60.70
2.4 Estimation results and analysis
Table 3 and Table 4 report the results of estimated models using the NAVCO and
MDMV datasets, respectively. Recalling that Hypothesis 1 contends that the risk of
demobilization increases the risk of dissident violence, across all estimated linear and
nonlinear estimated models, columns 1-4 in Table 3, the estimated coefficient for de-
mobilization risk is positive and significant. This result is consistent with Hypothesis
1. Figure 2 also shows the predicted probability of dissident violence at different levels
of demobilization risk, with a 95% confidence interval for the estimated logit model,
column 3 in in Table 3. This figure indicates that the likelihood of using violence as
a method of resistance rises if the risk of campaign demobilization increases.
Across the estimated models, I find partial support in favor of a negative associ-
ation between campaign size and the likelihood of dissident violence. This finding is
consistent with arguments in the literature that state popular support and violence
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Figure 2. The predicted probabilities of the dependent variables at different levels of
demobilization risk with 95% confidence intervals in the NAVCO dataset
are substitutes (arendt_violence_1969 Crenshaw 1981). However, this argument
cannot be applied to explain how a dissident movement reacts to a negative resource
shock. Although there is a positive association between a decrease in campaign size
and dissident violence in three of four estimated models, none of these estimated
coefficients are statistically significant.
I also find that repression decreases the likelihood of dissident violent. Simi-
larly, there is a negative association between democracy and dissident violence, but
it is statistically significant only in the fixed-effects model. Furthermore, while cam-
paigns with significant institutional reform, policy change, greater autonomy, and
anti-occupation objectives are less prone to using violent means of resistance, it is
more likely that secessionist campaigns resort to violence. I also find that the nonvi-
olent campaigns without a radical flank are slightly more likely to use violence as the
primary method of resistance. Finally, the estimation results show that the proba-
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Table 3. Estimation results (NAVCO)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS Logit Probit SEM(Success) SEM(Violent)
Demobilization risk (lagged) 0.001** 0.001+ 0.146* 0.066** 0.076*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.058) (0.023) (0.035)
Violent (lagged) 0.189 0.197 1.222
(0.158) (0.139) (1.095)
Nonviolent years -2.265 -1.107
(2.397) (0.897)
Nonviolent years2 0.293 0.155
(0.539) (0.202)
Nonviolent years3 -0.004 -0.003
(0.033) (0.012)
Size (lagged)
medium -0.007 0.001 -0.835+ -0.368+ 0.199 -0.458
(0.009) (0.013) (0.498) (0.209) (0.410) (0.415)
large -0.036+ 0.028 -1.948* -0.904** 0.643 -0.797
(0.020) (0.021) (0.805) (0.332) (0.469) (0.573)
extremely large -0.116** -0.029 0.657 -2.909**
(0.028) (0.044) (0.689) (0.650)
Size(decrease) (lagged) 0.004 0.012 0.201 -0.005 0.031
(0.012) (0.014) (0.703) (0.263) (0.396)
Size(increase) (lagged) 0.007 0.002 0.893 0.386 -0.198
(0.017) (0.017) (0.991) (0.341) (0.736)
Repression (lagged) -0.016 -0.037** -0.947* -0.505* -0.578** -0.368
(0.011) (0.013) (0.417) (0.202) (0.175) (0.266)
Democracy (lagged) -0.006 -0.051+ -0.054 -0.001 0.117 -0.290
(0.009) (0.031) (0.469) (0.197) (0.427) (0.425)
Goal
significant institutional reform -0.041 -0.022 -0.267 -0.061 0.946 -0.774
(0.031) (0.027) (1.070) (0.445) (1.561) (0.678)
policy change -0.006 -0.119* -0.440 -0.260 -1.081 -0.167
(0.017) (0.056) (0.719) (0.333) (0.719) (0.458)
territorial secession 0.013+ 0.041 1.182 0.346 -1.731** 0.860+
(0.008) (0.038) (0.791) (0.303) (0.547) (0.481)
greater autonomy -0.010 -0.000 -1.230 -0.591 -2.970* -0.496
(0.013) (0.022) (0.926) (0.397) (1.286) (0.649)
anti-occupation -0.004 0.024 -0.530 -0.405 -0.240 -0.231
(0.017) (0.024) (0.821) (0.318) (0.470) (0.619)
Radical flank
no -0.700** -0.411* -7.578** -4.023** -0.198 -5.687**
(0.164) (0.173) (2.756) (1.060) (0.914) (1.215)
yes -0.653** -0.339* -6.740* -3.409** -0.478 -5.087**
(0.174) (0.168) (2.661) (1.042) (0.849) (1.228)
Disorganization (lagged) 0.005 0.006 0.268 0.098 -0.148 0.194
(0.004) (0.005) (0.216) (0.085) (0.158) (0.180)
violent -1.893*
(0.842)
Constant 0.826** 0.843** 8.535** 4.567** -0.398 4.019**
(0.170) (0.172) (1.824) (0.891) (1.234) (1.278)
Observations 1,325 1,325 1,080 1,080 1,325 1,325
R-squared 0.822 0.399
Fixed effects No Yes No No No No
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered errors Campaign No Movement Campaign Campaign Campaign
Robust errors Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Loglikelihood 699.4 912.1 -77.50 -77.79 -297.8 -297.8
Number of campaigns 173
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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bility of dissident violent is higher for disorganized campaigns, but such associations
are not statistically significant.
Table 4. Estimation results (MDMV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS Logit Probit OLS OLS Logit Probit
Demobilization risk (lagged) 0.006** 0.010+ 0.092* 0.049* 0.006** 0.010+ 0.108+ 0.058*
(0.001) (0.005) (0.039) (0.020) (0.001) (0.005) (0.056) (0.025)
Expansion in participation -0.137** -0.186** -1.367* -0.723**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.642) (0.239)
Expansion in participation2 0.020** 0.025** 0.171* 0.093**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.087) (0.035)
Violent (lagged), 0.495** 0.303** 0.528** 0.308**
(0.078) (0.035) (0.089) (0.040)
Nonviolent days -1.111** -0.465** -1.298** -0.543**
(0.243) (0.079) (0.296) (0.097)
Nonviolent days2 0.067+ 0.027** 0.080* 0.032**
(0.036) (0.007) (0.037) (0.007)
Nonviolent days3 -0.001 -0.000** -0.001 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Size(decrease) (lagged), -0.132** -0.059+ -1.081** -0.696** -0.076** -0.031* -0.380* -0.233*
(0.040) (0.035) (0.297) (0.196) (0.021) (0.015) (0.161) (0.099)
Size(increase) (lagged) -0.074+ -0.026 -1.228** -0.780**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.402) (0.248)
Size (lagged) 0.019 0.001 0.162 0.095 0.016 -0.004 0.011 0.014
(0.018) (0.015) (0.160) (0.082) (0.018) (0.014) (0.119) (0.055)
Repression (lagged), -0.025* -0.003 -0.622** -0.367** -0.029* -0.008 -0.784** -0.478**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.201) (0.106) (0.011) (0.012) (0.190) (0.108)
Constant 0.027 -0.043 0.933 0.571 -0.029 -0.065 0.442 0.256
(0.073) (0.086) (0.686) (0.417) (0.054) (0.090) (0.616) (0.381)
Observations 1,705 1,705 1,696 1,696 1,705 1,705 1,696 1,696
R-squared 0.432 0.202 0.435 0.218
Fixed effects No Yes no no No Yes no no
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered errors Republic No Republic Republic Republic No Republic Republic
Robust errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loglikelihood -622.9 -493.8 -680.3 -693.6 -618.4 -477 -695.9 -713.2
Number of movements 47 47
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
In their book, Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) ascertain that nonviolent campaigns
are almost twice as successful as violent campaigns in achieving their objectives. Some
might doubt these results because of the possibility of an endogeneity problem. In fact,
there may be a bidirectional association between the campaign’s adopted strategy and
its success. Chenoweth and Stephan address this concern by estimating a two-stage
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model in which the campaign in the first stage concerns the method of resistance,
and the influence of resistance method on the likelihood of success is then estimated.
This two-stage model estimation also adds to the evidence for the higher efficacy
of nonviolent campaigns vis-a-vis violent campaigns. However, the authors do not
use any theoretical framework to estimate the campaign’s initial decision in the first
stage.
Since this study models the decision of dissident movements between violent and
nonviolent methods of resistance, I use the empirical model of this study to re-estimate
the effect of the method of resistance on its success. To do so, I estimate a simul-
taneous equation model (Amemiya 1977), with two equations in which the primary
method of resistance is an endogenous variable. The first equation is exactly the
main empirical model of this study, and the second equation estimates the influence
of resistance method, as an endogenous variable, on the likelihood of campaign suc-
cess, while I control for campaign size, repression, democracy, campaign goal, radical
flank, and disorganization.The estimations of these equations are reported in column
5 and column 6 of Table 3.
These results are consistent with Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2012) findings that
resorting to violence decreases the chance of success of dissident campaigns. How-
ever, I cannot find any statistically significant evidence that larger campaigns are
more successful than smaller campaigns in achieving their objectives. Wittels (2016)
similarly does not find a statistically significant association between campaign size
and campaign success. He contends that dissident movements require a pre-existing
socio-economic or political organization to benefit a popular participation.
Table 4 shows the estimations of my empirical models using the MDMV dataset.
The estimated effects of demobilization risk on dissident violence are positive and
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statistically significant across all models, columns 1-4. Moreover, Figure 4 shows
that an increase in the risk of demobilization raises the risk of dissident violence.
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Figure 3. The predicted probabilities of the dependent variables at different levels of
demobilization risk with 95% confidence intervals in the MDMV dataset
I find that the size of movements has a positive effect on the likelihood of dissi-
dent violent, but this effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, unlike the
estimated results in the NAVCO models, the analysis of MDMV dataset indicates
that an increase or decrease in the participation size relative to the previous period
makes the use of violent resistance less likely. However, the estimated effects of state
repression on the probability of dissident violence is similar to the findings of the
analysis using the NAVCO dataset: negative and statically significant.
Since the participation size variable in the NAVCO dataset was coded as a cate-
gorical variable, it was not possible to evaluate Hypothesis 2 by using the NAVCO
dataset. I add the amount of positive change in the participation size, expansion
in participation, and its square to evaluate the theorized nonlinear association be-
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tween the movement expansion and dissident violence. The estimated coefficients
of expansion in participation are negative and statically significant across all linear
and nonlinear models, columns 5-8 in Table 4. However, the square of expansion in
participation has a positive and statistically significant effect on dissident violence.
This empirical finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2. A positive increase in the
movement size decreases the likelihood of resorting to violence, since the movement
is receiving popular support and can thus rely on nonviolent tactics. However, if
this expansion is too large, then the monitoring and punishment mechanisms of the
movement can fail to control the radical, emotional, and spoiler members. Thus,
the environment would be ready for these members to deviate from the movement’s
nonviolent strategy and provoke violence.
Figure 4 indicates this nonlinear association between the expansion and dissi-
dent violence. For smaller values of this variable, an expansion decreases the risk
of violent resistance such that the probability of dissident violence approaches zero.
Nevertheless, the pacifying effect of expansion in participation on the likelihood of
dissident violence loses its statistical significance for expansions larger than 150,000
people. Furthermore, if this expansion passes a specific threshold, in this case 400,000
individuals, the association turns into a positive association. Finally, if the size of ex-
pansion is larger than 650,000 people, then its provocative effect on dissident violence
will be statistically significant.
2.5 Conclusion
Political conflict scholars have only recently begun to examine civil resistance as
an alternative to violent resistance, and this research has improved our understanding
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Figure 4. The predicted probabilities of the dependent variables at different levels of
demobilization risk with 95% confidence intervals for the MDMV dataset
of civil resistance. Nonetheless, such scholarly attention has been largely devoted to
the relative effectiveness of nonviolent resistance, and there have not been enough
studies on how violent and nonviolent tactics as methods of resistance emerge from
state-dissident interactions. Few studies discuss the structural determinants of these
resistance tactics in order to determine who adopts nonviolent methods of resistance.
However, they do not adequately explore the dynamics of state-dissident interactions
to illuminate when and why dissident movements substitute violent tactics for nonvi-
olent resistance.
This article argues that the risk of demobilization alters dissident movements’ eval-
uation of the trade-off between violent and nonviolent resistance and thus increases
the risk of dissident violence. In fact, civil resistance serves as a recruitment, mobi-
lization, and defection strategy, which keeps the movement committed to nonviolent
tactics. However, demobilization dilutes this commitment to nonviolent tactics, so
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the favorable consequences of resorting to violence outweigh its adverse consequences,
and the movement becomes more prone to use of violence for the sake of its survival.
In contrast, for dissident movements that are successful in mobilizing the discontented,
the movement is under no compulsion to use violent tactics.
Consistent with the literature, this study maintains that recruitment problems
cause movements to resort to violence. However, this association does not hold in the
short term because of the adverse consequences of using violence by dissidents. If we
replace the static models of resource mobilization with a dynamic version, then we
can explain how lasting, not temporary, mobilization problems over time signal the
movement to use violence in order to prevent its death. Knowing the effect of these
(de)mobilization dynamics on the movement’s evaluations allows us to model when
it is more likely.
The analysis of movement mobilization and demobilization patterns also reveals
a counter-intuitive nonlinear association between the expansion of movements and
dissident violence. A moderate increase in the size of the movement decreases the
risk of violence because of the rise of popular support. However, a large expansion of
the movement overburdens its monitoring and sanctioning capacities, raising the risk
of dissident violence.
Moreover, I re-evaluate Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2012) remarkable findings on
the efficacy of civil resistance by using the empirical model of this study as the initial
stage of dissident movements’ decision between violent and nonviolent resistance. My
empirical analysis also confirms these findings.
Nevertheless, there are dissident movements that fail to remain nonviolent, and
my analysis shows that the dynamics of demobilization contribute to this failure.
However, these dynamics are complex and require more in-depth studies. In fact,
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factors from inside and outside dissident movements threaten their existence through
different mechanisms (Davenport 2014). Disaggregating these mechanisms and evalu-
ating their effects on the movement’s evaluation of civil resistance over time can help
nonviolent activists address these issues. Another avenue of research for future is the
study of the constituent groups of dissident movements. At the second part of this
study, I relax movements as the unitary actor assumption, and doing so resulted in
a counterintuitive finding. In-depth case studies and network analysis of movement
should investigate how different groups within a movement react to the outcomes of
state-movement interaction. As an illustration, are radical groups within a movement
among the first to use violence? Alternatively, as shown in my empirical analysis, are
movements with a radical flank less likely to choose violence as a primary method of
resistance?
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Chapter 3
POLITICAL DISSENT, FOREIGN INTERVENTION, AND STATE
REPRESSION
What are the effects of foreign interventions on the dynamics of state-dissident
interactions? On January 28, 2011, the former US President Barak Obama reacted
to the protests in Egypt by asking the government of Egypt to stop repressing the
protesters. Before this, his administration at the White House threatened Hosni
Mubarak, the president of Egypt, that the US government would cut its aid to Egypt
if the use of violence against the protesters continued.45 On 11 February, Mubarak
resigned from the presidency and relinquished the power to the Armed Forces of
Egypt.
In December 2017 and January 2018, about 7 years after the Arab Spring, the
government of Iran experienced several days of anti-government protests and riots.
The current US president Donald Trump supported these anti-government protests
and criticized the Iranian government for ignoring the economic welfare and the polit-
ical freedom of its citizens, and condemned the use of violence against the protesters.
The press secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, also publicly expressed the White
House’s “unyielding support for demonstrators,” as a different strategy from Presi-
dent Obama’s “more reticent approach” during the 2009 Green Movement in Iran.46
Following these reactions, the New York Times published an article by Philip Gordon–
the former Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the
45The news is available on NBC news website: https://goo.gl/9Pw467
46See the New York Times article: https://goo.gl/CnNN1H
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Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf Region– which suggested that Pres-
ident Trump “be quiet” if he wants to help the protesters in Iran since his reactions
can weaken the oppositions’ position in this country.47
While the third-party interventions in civil wars have received a great deal of
attention among conflict scholars,48 the effects of foreign interventions on the dynam-
ics of the state-dissident interactions during the low-intensity conflict and popular
protests have remained understudied. Chyzh and Labzina (2018) explored how a
foreign third-party decides to assist her protégé in a popular dissent, and how this
shapes the outcomes of the conflict. However, how do the diplomatic efforts in favor
of the protesters affect the dynamics of conflict?
Nepstad in her book, Nonviolent Revolutions, investigates the role of international
sanctions on the success of nonviolent movements through a qualitative comparison of
three successful movements with three failed ones. She argues while sanctions usually
harm the nonviolent movements, there are cases that the authorities made minor
changes in their policies and slightly conceded to the protesters’ demands. However,
the foreign interventions and the international pressure on the authorities are not
limited to the international sanctions and the military actions. The international
community starts responding to the repression of the anti-government protests by
condemning the state’s use of violence and threatening to impose economic sanctions
and deploy military forces. If these prudent diplomatic responses fail, then the foreign
states and the international organizations decide to impose the economic sanctions
47See the New York Times article here: https://goo.gl/yx1uwB
48For example, see: Walter and Snyder 1999; Regan 2002b; Regan 2002a; Gleditsch and Beardsley
2004; Fortna 2004; Regan and Aydin 2006; Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009; D. E. Cunningham 2010;
Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2017.
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as a nonviolent strategy or use their military forces to change the authorities’ policies
in response to the domestic unrests.
This paper examines whether and how these low-cost diplomatic responses of the
foreign states and the international organizations such as the disapproval of state
repression, asking for political reform, the threat of imposing sanctions, and the
threat of deploying military forces in support of the anti-government protests and
rallies can shape the dynamics of dissent-repression. Although it is assumed that the
goal of these diplomatic efforts and reactions is to increase the cost of state repression
and to decrease the violations of human rights, there have been no systematic and
scientific studies on whether these attempts are effective in practice, or they are
another example of the nirvana fallacy regarding the foreign interventions in intra-
state conflicts.
There is an unsettled debate on the effectiveness of the third-party interventions
and their adverse effects on the conflict processes.49 The conflict literature also finds
inconsistent results about the effectiveness of the foreign interventions through hu-
manitarian aid.50 Considering these uncertain findings about the interventions of
the foreign actors in the intra-state conflicts and the popularity of the diplomatic
efforts in supporting the anti-government movements, it merits to ask whether and
how these efforts can serve their purpose of preventing the authorities to use coercive
actions and help the protesters to achieve their goals.
Developing a series of theoretical hypotheses and evaluating them using the Non-
violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data 3.0, I show that the
49For a detailed discussions of the current issues and debates in the literature, see Wallensteen
and Svensson (2014).
50For example, see Savun and Tirone (2012) and Wood and Sullivan (2015)
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diplomatic statements and gestures such as disapproving state behavior, asking for
political reform, threating to impose sanctions, and threatening to use military forces
either do not have any significant effect, or increase state repression and decreased
state concession during the Arab Spring. In fact, while the foreign interventions at
best encouraged more people to join the dissent and participate in the protests, they
increased political repression and decreased state concession during the Arab Spring,
too. However, in the cases that the state is dependent on the economic supports from
outside of the country, the foreign interventions are more likely to enhance dissident
participation, reduce state repression, and increase state concession. I check and dis-
cuss the robustness of these findings across different models using the fractional logit
and the seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE). The findings of this study
carry important policy implications for (i) the politicians who are often tempted and
encouraged to intervene in the civil conflicts of other countries, and (ii) political ac-
tivists who usually request and expect the support of foreign actors in their battle
against the state authorities in their countries.
3.1 The Role of Third-Parties in State-Dissident Interactions
When discontented citizens within a country fail to change the status quo us-
ing democratic processes,51 they consider contentious politics to increase the cost
of maintaining the status quo for the members of the ruling party. If these dis-
satisfied individuals overcome their collective action problem by following political
51This can be because of either lack of enough votes in democratic regimes or lack of democratic
institutions in authoritarian regimes.
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entrepreneurs52 or re-establishing the missions of existing social organizations,53 they
can start a movement to oppose the authorities and aim to compel the state to satisfy
the demanded policy changes.
However, there are countless real-world examples across history and geography
that the authorities, instead of changing their policies in response to the political
pressure, oppose the protesters using their coercive power. From the Civil Rights
Movements in the United States to the recent waves of protests in the Middle East,
known as the Arab Spring, authorities used political repression to control the social
and political movements. Scientific studies on the nexus of dissent-repression also
find widespread and strong evidence for the repressive response of the governments
to the dissent such that it has become known as the Law of Coercive Responsiveness54
or the Threat-Response Theory.55
Although there is a scholarly consensus on the popularity of political repression
among the state authorities, the conflict scholars face theoretical and empirical chal-
lenges to explain the variations in the repressive behavior of the states within and
across cases. In fact, it is well-accepted that the authorities resort to violence to con-
trol the dissent; however, the timing and the severity of this coercive behavior varies
across time and location. The literature investigated different factors and mecha-
nisms to explain these variations. Nevertheless, as Davenport (2007) discusses, the
52Olson 1965; Lichbach 1998
53McAdam 1999
54Davenport 2007
55Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003
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influence of the foreign actors and the international mechanisms on the dynamics of
state-dissent interactions is “one of the least developed findings” (16).
Indeed, the research in this area is mostly limited to how the international agree-
ments and treaties improve the governments’ respect for human rights. The main
idea of this research program is straightforward. It argues that signing and ratifying
the human rights treaties increase the expected cost of repression through different
mechanisms, so these international treaties and agreements decrease the likelihood
and severity of state repression. Bell, Clay, and Murdie (2012) and Fariss (2014), for
example, find that the international human rights organizations improve respect for
the human rights. On the other hand, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007), Hafner-
Burton (2008), Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer (2008), and Simmons (2009) do
not find strong support for this claim. In fact, they show that signing a human rights
treaty cannot guarantee a lower level of state repression and higher respect for the
human rights, and enforcement mechanisms within the country are required to reduce
the authorities’ coercive behavior effectively.
Despite their contributions to our understanding of the effectiveness of the in-
ternational treaties in improving the respect for human rights, the current research
mostly focuses on evaluating the international human rights at the macro-level and
does not explain the variations in the use and severity of state repression during
different episodes of political conflicts.
In other words, from this research, we know why the countries that sign the
international human rights treaties and develop domestic mechanisms to implement
them are less likely to repress; however, we still do not know why the authorities keep
political repression as an active tool to control the political dissent when their political
survival is challenged by the popular protests. For example, the use of coercive power
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by police during the Occupy Wall Street movement or the nonviolent protests in
the US university campus cannot be explained with the findings of the international
human rights literature. Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) identify this pattern in the
authorities’ behavior as “stickiness” to repression and Davenport (2007) calls it the
“stability of state coercive action over time.”
There are several reasons that the current literature on the effectiveness of the
international human rights cannot explain the role of external factors and actors in the
dynamics of dissent-repression. First, the international treaties are foreign structural
factors; so, they mostly can explain the structural changes in the likelihood and the
severity of state repression. In fact, they only can help us to explain the reduction in
the baseline probability and severity of political repression, yet they fail to contribute
to our understanding of the fluctuations in the state’s coercive actions around that
baseline probability when the conflict between the authorities and the discontented
citizens arises. This problem is not peculiar to this literature, and the structural
theories usually cannot explain the dynamics of political and social interactions in
the short-term although they do very well in explaining the structural changes and
the cross-case variations in the political outcomes.
Another reason making the current studies on the external factors incapable of
explaining the variations in the coercive behavior of state during political dissent
is that the literature has not explored adequately how the foreign actors’ behavior
and actions can influence the state-dissident interactions. In fact, even though the
conflict scholars recently employed formal models to offer a better understanding of
the strategic interactions between the state and the dissidents,56 the question of how
56Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014
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the foreign interventions can shape the dynamics of the state-dissent interactions
during the civil unrests has remained understudied.
Nepstad (2011) explored the effectiveness of nonviolent movements and discussed
why they are successful and why they fail by conducting an in-depth qualitative study
of six nonviolent revolutions. As part of this research, she finds that the economic
sanctions in support of the anti-government protests mostly harm these movements,
and the authorities slightly concede to the protesters’ demands only in a small number
of occasions. However, this study does not investigate the effect of diplomatic efforts
and statements on the state’s and the dissidents’ behavior.
Furthermore, Nepstad’s main goal in this book is exploring the mechanisms
through which nonviolent movements succeed or fail. Therefore, discussing the ef-
fects of the foreign interventions through economic sanctions on the state’s and the
dissidents’ behavior is not at the core of her arguments. Indeed, the two mechanisms
that she discusses to explain the failure of the international sanctions in helping the
nonviolent movements are mostly focused on the international mechanisms, instead
of discussing the domestic mechanisms.
First, she argues that when one state imposes the economic sanctions, the allies of
the target state have incentives to assist the sanctioned authorities. This mechanism
is exactly what is discussed in the international sanction literature as the “black
knight” mechanism (Drury 1998; Nooruddin 2002). Second, it is discussed that the
economic sanctions give undue power to the foreign actors that can be exploited in a
way that hurts the movement. These two mechanisms, therefore, do not explain how
economic sanctions as a form of foreign interventions shape the strategic interactions
between the state and the dissidents.
In another study, Chyzh and Labzina (2018) explore foreign actors interventions
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during a political dissent. Using a signaling game, the authors investigate under
which conditions a patron state removes its support of a protégé leader during a
political conflict. The model shows that the patron decides to “bankroll” the cost of
repression based on how the fall of the protégé affects her cost and benefit. This is an
interesting finding, yet a question remains unanswered: how does foreign intervention
in support of dissidents, with the goal of decreasing state repression and human rights
violations, shape the dynamics of the interactions between the state and dissidents
during political dissent?
In addition to satisfying our intellectual curiosity, the answers to this question
have important policy implications for politicians and political activists. It is usually
claimed that foreign interventions can lessen the risk of political and social conflict
through bringing economic prosperity to underdeveloped areas as well as reducing the
risk and the duration of civil conflicts through resolving the private information and
the credibility issues. However, recent findings in the conflict literature cast doubt
on the efficacy of the foreign interventions.
There has been a long-lasting debate on the effectiveness of third-party mediation
in resolving intra- and inter-state conflict (Kleiboer 1996; Beardsley 2008; Gartner
2011). Fey and Ramsay (2010) question the effectiveness of the third-party mediation
since adversaries in a conflict have incentives to lie to the mediator and preclude them
from collecting information to resolve the private information problem. A. Kydd(2003
and 2006) also queries, even if we assume that the mediator collected an adequate
level of information to facilitate the conflict resolution, how she can send a credible
signal to the adversaries. RezaeeDaryakenari and Thies (2017) also argue that if
conflict resolution threatens a mediator’s economic benefits, she behaves deceitfully
72
and prevents a peaceful outcome. These studies, as few examples, raise doubt about
the effectiveness of foreign interventions through the third-party mediation.
Moreover, in foreign aid literature, Savun and Tirone (2011; 2012) find that the
foreign aid decreases the risk of civil war and improves the chance of successful demo-
cratic transitions. Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009) also show that develop-
ment aid can improve social cohesion after civil war. However, Nunn and Qian (2014)
find that U.S. food aid increases the duration of civil conflicts. Narang (2015) also
argues that humanitarian aid increases adversaries’ uncertainty about their rival’s
relative capacity, decreasing the chance of conflict resolution and prolonging civil
war. Furthermore, Wood and Sullivan (2015) explore the effect of the humanitarian
aid during civil conflicts on civilian victimization. They find while the foreign aid
decreases state violence, it increases rebel violence. Similar to the third-party media-
tion, there has not been a consensus in this literature on the beneficial effects of the
foreign interventions through the humanitarian aid.
While the conflict scholars investigated the role of the foreign interventions
through the humanitarian aid and the third-party mediation during militarized con-
flicts, the literature has not investigated how diplomatic gestures, such as condemning
state repression and threatening to impose economic sanctions or to use military force,
shape the state authorities’ and the dissidents’ behavior. This paper specifically fo-
cuses on these low-cost diplomatic gestures since they are usually the initial responses
by the foreign actors to the anti-government protests and rallies as civil conflicts un-
fold, which are usually accompanied by the state’s coercive repression based on the
Law of Coercive Responsiveness. These diplomatic responses and efforts, unlike im-
posing sanctions and deploying military troops, require mobilizing smaller resources
and following relatively less complicated bureaucratic procedures. Thus, these are
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considered feasible options that are better than not reacting to the violations of hu-
man rights, but they are less costly than taking actual actions.
Even if the foreign actors, who are concerned about the violations of human rights
and the political repression and plan to go beyond talks and threats, need time to
mobilize their resources and receive the required legal support and permissions from
domestic or international institutions. However, instead of remaining silent during
this preparation and negotiation period, the foreign actors rely on the diplomatic
gestures and statements such as condemning the state repression and threatening to
impose economic sanctions or deploy military force.
Although it is assumed that the goal of these diplomatic efforts and reactions is
increasing the cost of state repression and decreasing the human rights violations,
there is not any systematic and scientific study on their efficacy. Given the debates
on the effectiveness of the foreign interventions in the third-party mediation and the
humanitarian aid literature, it is helpful to discuss and examine the effects of these
diplomatic efforts, aiming to benefit the dissidents and reduce political repression
during civil conflicts. The remaining parts of this paper develop several theoretical
hypotheses to answer this question and evaluate them empirically.
Diplomatic Pressure on State: Helping Dissent or Harming Dissent?
Ritter (2014) discusses three principles/assumptions in the dissent-repression lit-
erature. First, there is a disagreement between state authorities and dissatisfied
citizens over a policy issue. Second, the discontented citizens and the state consider
both their’s and their rival’s strategic behavior and then decide how to dissent and
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repress to change or maintain the status quo, respectively. Third, these strategic
actions determine the outcome policy and the authorities’ hold on political power.
These assumptions allow scholars to develop their theories of dissent-repression
based on a “soft rationalism”57, though the use of game theory models by Pierskalla
(2010), Ritter (2014), and Chyzh and Labzina (2018) changed it into a stronger
version of rationality. Thus, as a result of these assumptions, the current studies in
the literature, either using the game theory approach or a softer version of rationalism,
mostly explore how different factors, mostly domestic, shape authorities’ decisions
about repression and discontented citizens’ decisions about dissent.
Political dissent is an episodic and public mobilization of discontented citizens
making a claim against state authorities through non-institutionalized collective ac-
tions, either violent or nonviolent. This definition of the dissent from the contentious
politics literature includes a wide variety of collective actions from riots and strike to
civil wars and revolutions (Goldstone 2001; S. Tarrow 2013). Despite this inclusive
definition of the dissent, this study mainly focuses on the effect of foreign diplomatic
statements and threats on the nexus of dissent-repression during the time that civil
conflict arises and unfolds because I want to examine whether these diplomatic ef-
forts are effective in reducing political repression, which is used by the authorities to
control the anti-government protests. This is one of the questions that has remained
understudied in the conflict literature, as discussed in the previous section.
While there is more agreement on the definition of political dissent among so-
cial scientists, scholars define state repression differently. Stockdill (2003) defines it
as: “any actions taken by authorities to impede mobilization, harass and intimidate
activists, divide organizations, and physically assault, arrest, imprison, and/or kill
57Davenport 2007
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movement participation.”(146) Meanwhile, Moore (2000) defines state repression as
“anything from public denouncements through the use of physical force.”(111) Dav-
enport (2007) describes state repression as “the actual or threatened use of physical
sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the state, or the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring spe-
cific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel,
practices or institutions.”(2) Among these definitions, Tilly (1978) offers the most
inclusive definition of state repression: “any action by another group which raises the
contender’s cost of collective action.” (100) Based on Tilly’s definition, in addition
to political arrests, torture, and terrors, non-violent and legal actions that impede
the collective challenge of the state are repression. Therefore, the attempts by the
Pinochet government to hinder the flow of funds to the Chilean Catholic Churches is
a form of repression58 based on Tilly’s definition of repression.
Here, I define state repression as any realized or threatened use of coercive forces
by the state to impede collective action. For example, the heavy presence of security
forces on the streets that arrest any small groups as well as security check-points are
state repression. This definition also counts the public announcement of state officials
using coercive behavior in a case of dissent towards state since this increases the
expected cost of the protest for the dissatisfied citizens and can decrease the number
of participants in the future protests. I use this definition because the foreign actors
mostly are concerned about the use of coercive force and human rights violations
(Poe and Tate 1994). Furthermore, the available datasets on state repression mainly
collect data on these coercive actions and threats.
States have the monopoly of using violence within their geographic borders, and
58Loveman 1998; Earl 2003
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in return, they promise to provide security as one of the public goods. However, the
state authorities sometimes use their military power to repress and control their polit-
ical rivals. In these cases, foreign actors usually take different political actions to send
a signal to these authorities letting them know that they are aware of and concerned
about the violations of human rights. International non-Governmental Organizations
(INGOs), such as Amnesty International, and International Governmental Organiza-
tions (IGOs), such as the UN and the UN security council, often actively monitor
and document the use of coercive power by the state authorities against their citizens.
While the former organizations mostly rely on documenting the cases of human rights
violations and naming-and-shaming mechanisms,59 the latter ones have a higher po-
litical leverage to go beyond reporting and shaming the violators of human rights.
(Lillich 1995; Cameron 2003; Bailey 2016)
For instance, the UN A/RES/42/23 resolution in 198760 on “the escalating repres-
sion of and State terror against opponents” urged all states to stop selling oil to the
apartheid regime of South Africa. This was one of the first efforts by the international
community to increase the cost of human rights violations by a member state. Thus,
the international organizations have a capacity to punish the governments that use
excessive coercive power against their citizens. When an international organization
makes a public statement about the violations of human rights during a civil conflict,
the authorities should consider that the continuation of political repression can lead
to international punishment by the international community.
In addition to the international organizations, some foreign states react to the civil
conflict in other countries. During the Arab Spring, several western political leaders
59Hafner-Burton 2008; DeMeritt 2012; Hendrix and Wong 2013
60Text is available here: https://goo.gl/qjY9aN
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asked the authorities in these countries to satisfy protesters’ demands for political
reforms and stop using repression against them. For example, President Obama on
February 2, 2011, asked Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt and a long-time ally
of the US in the region, to “recognize that the status quo is not sustainable and
a change must take place” as one of the main demands of protesters in the Tahrir
square.61 UK prime minister, David Cameron, also warned the Egyptian authorities
to “go down the path of reform and not repression” as these coercive responses “would
end badly” for their country and the world.62 In another case, the European countries
and the US threatened to impose sanctions against the authorities in Libya as they
continued to use repression to suppress the popular uprising in this country during
the Arab Spring.63
As discussed in the literature, authorities incur logistical and legitimacy costs if
they resort to violence to quash political dissent. However, making concessions is also
a costly decision since conceding the political and economic power to the opponents
means the authorities should disregard a share, or all, of their political and economic
privileges. If the authorities decide to repress, they do not have to share their benefits
with their opponents, but they should pay for the cost of repression. In cases that this
coercive method succeeds, the authorities can maintain the status quo and continue
benefiting their political power in the following periods. On the other hand, if the
authorities choose to compromise, then they give up a part, or all, of their benefits
in the future, yet they cut the monetary and non-monetary costs of repression.
61https://goo.gl/atrkf
62https://goo.gl/eyTyMV
63https://goo.gl/DPabwr
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The public statements by the foreign actors that ask for respect towards the citi-
zens’ right to peaceful protest, invite the authorities to peaceful political reforms, and
threaten to impose economic sanctions and use their military forces seek to increase
the (expected) cost of state repression for the authorities, so that they become less
oppressive. However, some might argue that this shaming, warning, and threaten-
ing mechanisms are not effective in changing the authorities’ behavior since they are
cheap-talks and too costly to be realized.
Although this is a valid point, there is also evidence on the effectiveness of these
seemingly ineffective actions. For instance, DeMeritt (2012) finds that the naming-
and-shaming mechanisms can be effective in reducing state repression. Furthermore,
Tingley and Walter (2011) through a randomized experiment explore whether cheap-
talks can deter conflict. They find that sending costless threats can change the
behavior of the rival actor. There is also evidence in the literature of economic
sanctions that the threats of imposing international sanctions can be important and
effective in changing the targeted states’ policies (Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan, Bapat,
and Kobayashi 2014).
In fact, even if these diplomatic efforts have not led to severe punishment yet,
they show that the foreign actors are aware of and concerned about the violations of
human rights by the authorities. This increases the expected cost of using repression
as it can trigger the sanctioning mechanisms and go beyond the naming-and-shaming
and political threats. Thus, these diplomatic gestures and efforts can make political
repression more costly for the authorities. If so, then it is reasonable to expect that
these diplomatic efforts decrease state repression.
From Moore (2000) that uses a formal model to explain the substitution between
the repression and accommodation in the governments’ behavior during civil conflicts
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to more recent studies by Pierskalla (2010), Ritter (2014), and Chyzh and Labzina
(2018) that explore the state-dissent strategic interactions through game-theory mod-
els,64 all of these studies on state repression imply that any increases in the cost of
repression decreases the state’s use of coercive force and instead increases the chance
of state concession. Thus, as the foreign interventions increase the cost of repres-
sion, authorities should be more willing to respond by making concession. We can
summarize the above discussions in as the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Foreign statements and threats against authorities during civil
conflict decrease state repression.
Hypothesis 2a: Foreign statements and threats against authorities during civil
conflict increase state concession.
In addition to shaping the authorities’ behavior, the foreign interventions can alter
the citizens’ evaluation of participating in the anti-government protests. Moore and
Jaggers (1990), and Gates (2002) explain that political entrepreneur and opposition
leaders offer an appeal (contract) to the discontented and grieved citizens to join
their movement. Olson (1965)’s formulation of an individual’s cost-benefit analysis
of participating in collective activities showed that a rational actor prefers not to
participate in collective activities as s/he can receive the expected benefit of collective
goods by free-riding on others’ participation. Given this argument, he concludes that
in theory, we should not observe collective goods. However, despite the reality of the
collective action problem and the prevalence of the free-riding, we can find many cases
in which individuals overcome their collective-action problem and produce collective
64Moore (2000) assumes that dissidents behavior is exogenous in his model, yet the recent studies
relax this assumption as they use game theory models to model authorities and dissidents’ behavior.
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goods. Olson’s suggestion for solving this puzzle was “private incentives” through
which each person is rewarded or punished individually.
Political dissent also is a collective action; so, it is prone to the collective action
problem. However, history has experienced many collective political actions such as
revolutions, civil wars, protests, strikes, and so forth. Thus, the dissatisfied citizens
find a way to solve their collective action problem and challenge the status quo. Gates
(2002) theoretically explains how rebel groups offer monetary and non-monetary in-
centives to recruit their members. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) also empirically
shows that private incentive such as monetary compensation, safe shelter, and the
sense of community belonging affected the individuals who voluntarily joined the
rebel groups in Sierra Leone. In addition to explaining how individuals overcome
their collective action problem within a rational choice framework, some sociologists
and political economists employed the social norms and the evolutionary theories to
explain why individuals are not pure “rational egoist,” though they evaluate the cost
and benefit of their actions (Ostrom 2000; Gächter and Fehr 1999; Ikeda and Richey
2005)
Either there are direct private incentives to the dissatisfied citizens such as direct
monetary payments and the promise of political positions after toppling the state,
or it is the peer pressure from the network of friends, a decrease in state repression
makes political participation in the anti-government political activities relatively less
costly since the discontented citizens include the cost of repression in their cost-benefit
analysis. Thus, if the foreign interventions successfully decrease state repression and
improve the chance of state concession, then there would be more dissatisfied citizens
who publicly reveal their preferences through participating in the anti-government
protests (Kuran 1989).
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When the foreign actors denounce the use of coercive force by the authorities and
caution them that they are ready to take actions to punish the violations of human
rights, these messages, though address the authorities, but indirectly send a signal to
the dissatisfied citizens, too. In fact, one of the mechanisms that nonviolent conflict
scholars discuss as a benefit of civil resistance is that this method of resistance is more
effective in attracting the support of foreign actors, which persuade more people to
join the movement (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). Thus, we can expect that:
Hypothesis 3a: Foreign statements and threats against authorities during civil
conflict increase the number of protesters.
Above, I discussed the beneficial effects of the foreign interventions in reducing
state repression and supporting the political movements through the diplomatic state-
ments and efforts without imposing economic sanctions and deploying military forces.
As much as we hope for the realization of the above outcomes, limiting the results of
the foreign interventions to these promising outcomes tends to overlook the complicity
of the dynamics of strategic interactions between the authorities and the dissidents.
Below, I contend that the foreign interventions in the form of the public disapproval
of state repression, the demand for political reforms, and the threats of economic sanc-
tions and military actions can intensify political repression, reduce state concession,
and decrease anti-government dissent.
Hypothesis 3a predicts that foreign interventions increase the number of the cit-
izens who join the anti-government protests. This means that the capacity of the
opposition movement to challenge the authorities and disrupt the governance of the
state increases. Thus, the authorities feel more pressure to listen and respond to the
protesters’ demands. However, as Ritter (2014) discusses, making concession in both
authoritarian and democratic regime can threaten the survival of the regime and the
82
ruling party. Thus, this change in the balance of power in favor of the dissidents
accompanied by an increase in the threats to the status quo persuade the state au-
thorities to use their coercive power more so that political repression helps them to
control the dissent. Here if the authorities decide not to repress, then they should
bend to the dissidents’ demands, which is costly and can lead to losing the power.
Furthermore, backing off from being a strongman can disappoint the supporters of
the regime and make their position on supporting the state shaky.
Pierskalla (2010) also shows that the military and a hardliner faction in the regime
see the reluctance of the ruling party in using force to suppress the protesters as a
sign of weakness. Thus, to protect their political and economic power, they consider a
plan to overthrow the regime through a coup. In addition, any signs showing that the
authorities are unwilling to use their coercive force to repress the dissidents can send
a signal to the foreign rivals that the state is incapable of defending itself, causing
security threats from the outside of the country.
Hence, on the one hand, there is a possibility, but it is not certain, that the foreign
actors would punish the authorities if they continue the use of coercive power and
violate human rights. On the other hand, hesitation towards controlling the dissent
using repressive actions can cause more security issues from the inside and the outside
of the country, threatening the political survival of the authorities.
Besides the above mechanisms, the foreign interventions can help the authorities
to decrease the domestic cost of political repression if they so decided. The state
authorities should incur the logistic and legitimacy cost of using repression. Even in
authoritarian regimes, the ruling party does not have full support from its supporting
coalition to use the military forces discretionally.65 Furthermore, the state relies on
65Weeks 2012
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the loyalty of security forces to arrest, torture, and kill the dissidents. In addition
to physical exhaustion, severe oppression of the innocent and defenseless citizens
can pose a dilemma for the security forces between their commitment to the regime
and their responsibility to defend their fellow citizens. This dilemma is more likely
if protesters remain committed to nonviolent methods of resistance despite state
repression. (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012) In fact, there are both anecdotal evidence
of and scientific research on the defection of security forces during civil conflicts —
like what happened during the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the 2011 Tunisian Revolution,
and the 2011 Civil Uprising in Syria (McLauchlin 2010; Nepstad 2013; Lutterbeck
2013).66
When the foreign actors either support the dissent or disapprove political repres-
sion, authorities have an opportunity to re-frame the confrontation. The authorities
can call the dissidents traitors who are related to the foreigners and accuse them
of disturbing the peace and threatening the security of the country. This can raise
nationalist sentiment among the citizens and increase the support for the regime,
similar to the rally around flag mechanism which is discussed in the literature of eco-
nomic sanctions (Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). This support increases
the state’s political leverage to repress its opposition even more than before as these
dissidents are now framed as mischief-makers and traitors. The security forces also
based on this new framing of the issue can convince themselves that by repressing the
protesters, they are serving their country and the people by protecting them against
the foreign interventions.
The foreign interventions also can work in favor of the authorities through another
mechanism. State repression sometimes can backfire, as using coercive force against
66In Syria case, the civil uprising escalated to the Civil War
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the people hurts the state’s legitimacy (Sullivan and Davenport 2017). In fact, the
brutality of the authorities in suppressing the protesters can cause dissatisfaction
among the citizens who did not initially have a problem with the state, but the
way that the authorities responded to the dissidents’ demands becomes a source of
grievance.
However, if the state finds a way to delegitimize the protesters and damage their
public images, then it is less likely that state repression upset the citizens, because
the state’s coercive power now is used legitimately against the guilty and traitorous
individuals. For instance, during the Arab Spring, some of the countries that expe-
rienced the waves of anti-government protests called the dissidents traitors and the
agents of foreign countries or agencies. Bahrain blamed protesters for being played
by Iran.67 Hosni Mubarak and his Vice-President also publicly criticized reporters,
foreigners, and rights workers for fueling the protests in Egypt.68 Israel and the US
also were among the foreign countries that Bashar Al Assad blamed for the unrests
and the civil war in Syria.69 Even Vladimir Putin accused Hilary Clinton, the US
Secretary of State, of supporting and funding unrests during the 2011 parliamentary
elections in Russia.70
Whether these claims are valid, and whether these interventions are effective in
starting major episodes of protests is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless,
accusing protesters of being the agents of the foreign actors and receiving support
67https://goo.gl/6aBh9
68https://goo.gl/4iovmL
69https://goo.gl/YqiUCh
70https://goo.gl/NADyGY
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from them is a common observation during civil conflicts. Thus, if the authorities
hesitated before to use, or even increase, their coercive force to control the dissent
due to a concern about the backfire effect, the foreign interventions can reduce this
concern and so increase the level of political repression against the dissidents, since
it is less likely that the citizens blame the state for using excessive force against a
group of traitors.
In cases that the foreign actors threaten the authorities with economic sanctions
and military interventions, the ruling party’s propaganda campaign can even blame
the protesters for the country being on the verge of economic sanctions and even
a war because of what they did, so the authorities should control these protesters
and punish them for causing this problem. In fact, the behavioral models show that
individuals are more risk-averse when they expect loss.71 Both economic sanctions
and war can cause significant levels of loss. Thus, while part of the citizens were in
sympathy with the dissidents before the foreign interventions, the threats of economic
sanctions and war can change their opinion, and they stop their support of the dissent.
If the state’s propaganda campaign works effectively, even some of the protesters can
become worried about the adverse consequences of their actions on the future of the
country and stop participating in the protests. Thus, in addition to decreasing out-
of-movement supports, the number of protesters also can decline following the foreign
interventions.
The adverse effects of foreign interventions on state policies and dissent are as
follow:
71See Bendor et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion the application of the behavioral models in
studying politics.
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Hypothesis 1b: Foreign statements and threats against authorities during civil
conflict increase state repression.
Hypothesis 2b: Foreign statements and threats against authorities during civil
conflict decrease state concession.
Hypothesis 3b: Foreign statements and threats against authorities during civil
conflict decrease the number of protesters.
Clearly, the state authorities know that there is a chance that the threats become
real if they continue their oppressive strategy. However, making a concession is also a
costly decision since it can send a signal of weakness to the military and the hardliners
inside of the country and to the rival foreign states. Thus, both repression and
concession are costly. Some might argue that the international mechanisms are rigid,
and it is hard and expensive to mobilize the international resources to make the foreign
threats real. Furthermore, the effectiveness of economic sanctions, especially against
authoritarian regimes, has not received empirical supports yet. The authorities in
the countries with a relatively decent record of respect for human rights also can
speculate that a short period of political repression would not cause a big problem in
the future, and they can get away with their short-term violations of human rights
when the dissent is controlled. For instance, the government of Bahrain severely
repressed peaceful protests of the Shi’a majority in this country with the support of
the Saudi Arabian Army.72 Despite the cases of severe human rights violations and
state repression, the government of Bahrain has never been sanctioned and punished
for what happened during the Arab Spring in this country.
Thus, it is more likely that the authorities discount the importance of public
disapproval and the threats from the outside, even though these interventions can
72https://goo.gl/e7M9WH
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assist them to repress their opponents. The discussed mechanisms of the naming-
and-shaming and the foreign threats can be effective only if the state authorities find
them adequately credible. In other words, these foreign interventions can contribute
to making the state less oppressive, if the authorities take them seriously. One of the
factors that can help us to determine whether the authorities weigh the foreign actors’
opinion in their decisions is the significance of their economic relationship with the
foreign states and organizations.
Blanton and Blanton (2007) explore the association between the respect for human
rights and foreign direct investment (FDI), and they find a positive association. Barry,
Clay, and Flynn (2013) also specifically explore the effect of the naming-and-shaming
mechanism on FDI. They find evidence that the naming-and-shaming by the INGOs
can decrease the level of FDI in developing countries. Indeed, the countries with a
higher level of FDI are more dependent on the foreign economic sources, and so more
vulnerable to the foreign threats.
Prospective investors also are less interested in investing in a country that has
received economic and military threats from other countries. Thus, we can expect
that the states with a higher level of FDI take foreign actors’ opinion and threats more
seriously when they decide between responding with repression or concession. The
effect of FDI on the efficacy of the discussed foreign interventions can be summarized
as follow:
Hypothesis 4: The beneficial (adverse) effects of foreign statements and threats
against state authorities increase (decrease) as foreign direct investment increases.
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3.2 Empirical Analysis
I use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 3.0 (NAVCO)73 to
study how the foreign interventions that are limited to statements and threats affected
the popular protests and the political repression during the Arab Spring. NAVCO 3.0
is an event database which covers both violent and nonviolent conflict events in 21
countries between 1991 and 2012. The dataset covers the conflict events in Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen
from the Middle-East and North Africa region.
Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates are not covered in the NAVCO 3.0. Although discontented citizens in these
countries organized a few days of protests, most of them did not experience significant
and stable episodes of civil conflict. Consequently, even if we had the data for these
cases, there would be limited numbers of conflict events which do not provide much
information about the question I ask in this study. For the cases that the data is
available, I limit my study to the reported conflict events after 17 December 2017,
when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire and the protests started one after another
in the region.
I specifically focus on the Arab Spring since political dissent and state repression
are affected by many mechanisms and factors. Some of these factors are not observ-
able, so we do not have data about them. Limiting our attention to these maximalist
movements, as named in Chenoweth and Stephan (2012), gives us an opportunity to
study the interactions between the governments and the dissidents without being dis-
tracted with the spontaneous and short-term episodes of contentious politics, which
73Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2017
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do not provide adequate information about the foreign interventions. The second
reason is that the Arab Spring attracted a lot of attention in the world, so we can
observe different types of foreign interventions during this period. This allows us to
study and evaluate the theoretical arguments of this paper.
Although the conflict events in the NAVCO 3.0 are reported on a daily base, I
aggregate the data to the weekly level to reduce the risk of reporting-error as it is
possible that the news related to the conflict event is published with few days delay.
The unit of analysis, therefore, is country-week.
Considering the developed hypotheses, I have three dependent variables: partic-
ipation, repression, and concession. Participation is the average number of individ-
uals who participated in dissent events per week. Since the population of countries
in this region changes significantly from one case to another, I divide the number
of protesters by the total population of each country so that I can study the vari-
ations in the participation size across these countries, without being worried about
the effect of each country’s total population size. The number of protesters comes
from the “participation_size” variable in the NAVCO dataset, and I used the World
Bank Open Data website to get the data on population. This variable is labeled as
participation size.
The second dependent variable is repression. NAVCO 3.0 uses actor and event
coding of the CAMEO events project to report the conflict events. Based on my
definition of repression in the previous section, I code any coercive actions such as
banning political parties, imposing a curfew, shutting down the Internet, damaging
property, abducting, torturing, killing, and so forth by central and local state au-
thorities and forces. In fact, I included any actions, either violent or nonviolent, by
governments that impede the collective actions of dissatisfied citizens as state repres-
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sion. Following Ritter (2014), I counted the number of these actions per week for
each country and then divided them by the total number of reported events for that
country per week to control for the possibility of under-reporting and over-reporting
of conflict events for the countries in the sample. This variable, in fact, gives the
average number of repression events per week for each country.
Using a similar approach, I counted the number of concessions made by the state
and calculated the average of state concession per each week. For coding the conces-
sions that are made by governments, I consider not only the events in which the state
accedes to requests or demands for political reform, but also partial concessions such
as easing administrative sanctions and state of emergency or martial law are counted
as state concession. This variable is label as concession. A detailed list of the actions
that are coded as state repression and concession are available in the Appendix.
I also use the verb codes in the NAVCO 3.0 to code the foreign interventions
as a categorical variable. If a foreign actor disapproves a government’s actions, I
coded it 1 and labeled it disapprove. If a foreign actor addresses the authorities
and asks for political reform, then it is coded 2 and is labeled as political reform.
The NAVCO dataset also provides data on whether foreign actors threaten to take
nonviolent actions such as reducing or stopping aid; imposing sanctions, boycotting,
or implementing an embargo; and reducing or breaking relations. I code these types of
interventions 3, and it is labeled nonviolent threat. And finally, I code the fourth group
of the foreign interventions when a foreign actor threatens to use its military power
against the state during the civil conflict. This type of intervention is coded 4 and is
labeled as violent threat. The examples of the foreign actions that are coded as violent
threat are threatening to impose a blockade, occupy a territory, use unconventional
violence, launch a conventional attack, attack with the Weapons of mass destruction.
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If there was not a foreign intervention, then I coded it 0 and labeled it as no response.
The list of the actions that are used for coding the foreign interventions in this study
is available in the Appendix.
Based on the available information in the NAVCO 3.0, we also can code the types
of foreign actors. I divided the foreign actors into three groups so that I can check the
robustness of my empirical analysis across different types of actors. The first group
includes the foreign interventions by any sovereign states; I use the label foreign states
to distinguish them in my analysis. The second group of actors is the United Nations,
Amnesty International, the Red Cross, and other similar organizations. These foreign
actors are labeled all together as the international organizations (IOs). Since states
have different levels of power and influence in the world politics, I also create a variable
that only includes the foreign interventions by the permanent members of the UN
Security Council and Germany. Although Germany is not a permanent member of
the Security Council, it plays a crucial role in the European Union. I label this group
of foreign actors roughly as the UNSC, although it includes Germany.
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 show the distribution of the discussed foreign
intervention during the Arab Spring by different groups of the actors. In about 45-50%
of weeks, the foreign actors condemned or threatened the authorities in these middle
eastern countries. Across these different types of the interventions, disapproving state
actions is the most common type of foreign intervention. Asking for political reforms
is the second most frequent reaction. Finally, nonviolent and violent threats form
about 10 percent of reactions; the share of nonviolent threats is slightly larger than
violent threats.
For testing Hypothesis 4, I use a second independent variable, foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), to estimate the conditional effect of FDI on the beneficial (harmful)
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Figure 5. Interventions by foreign states during the Arab Spring
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Figure 6. Interventions by International Organizations during the Arab Spring
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Figure 7. Interventions by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and
Germany during the Arab Spring
effects of the foreign intervention. This variable is measured as the share of net inflow
of FDI in GDP, and its data comes from the World Bank Open Data website.
I use several methods to estimate my regression models. Since participation size,
repression, and concession are limited fractional variables, i.e. [0; 1], I apply the
maximum likelihood estimation method for fractional models, developed by Papke
and Wooldridge (1996). These authors argue that “the drawbacks of linear models
for fractional data are analogous to the drawbacks of the linear probability model
for binary data”(620). Thus, I estimate my regression models using the fractional
logistic model.74
Authorities’ decision between using repression and making concession can be re-
74We can use either logit or probit; I estimated both functional forms, and the results do not
change substantially. The results of logit models are reported, as these models showed a slightly
better explanatory power relative to the probit models.
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lated to each other. As discussed before, the literature finds that repression and
concession are substitutes (Moore 2000). Furthermore, the state’s responses to the
dissent can share common determinants that are not observed and measured, and
so omitted from our regression models. Consequently, some might suggest that we
need to estimate a system of equations to study the state’s decision in each period.
However, due to the possibility of contemporaneous cross-equation errors, we cannot
estimate these equations separately.
Zellner (1962) developed Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) to
address this issue. Recently, some conflict scholars have used this method for studying
political actors’ decisions between different options. For instance, Cunningham, Dahl,
and Frugé (2017) employed SURE to study the interdependence of nonviolent tactics
in self-determination movements.75
Also, I include control variables that have been discussed in the literature to be im-
portant determinants of state repression/concession and popular dissent. Population
is one of the most common and the most robust variables in civil conflict literature
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Ritter 2014). Conflict scholars also explored the influ-
ence of economic development dissent and repression (Davenport 1996; Fearon and
Laitin 2003 Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). I measured
economic development using GDP per capita. The data for population and GDPper
capita come from the World Bank Open Data website. I use the log-transformation
of these two variables since the distribution of these two variables is skewed in the
sample.
The effect of regime type on dissent and repression is one of the first mechanisms
75For detail on estimating SURE models with fractional dependent variables see: Roodman (2011)
and https://github.com/droodman/cmp
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that is explored in this literature. It is argued that democracies are less likely to
experience dissent and political repression. In his review article, Davenport (2007)
presents this association, known as the domestic democratic peace, as one the core
findings of the literature. I use the electoral democracy index from the V-Dem project
as a proxy for the regime type. I report the models with democracy variable as one
of the control variables in the Appendix since the data for Yemen and Bahrain in
2012 is missing, so the samples size shrinks significantly. Despite this reduction in
the sample size, the estimated results do not change significantly.
Nonviolent conflict literature also suggests that resorting to violence decreases the
number of citizens participating in protests (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Nepstad
2011). However, this literature has not explored whether the methods of resistance,
violent vs. nonviolent, affect the state repression. Using NAVCO 1.1, which focuses
mainly on the outcome of nonviolent and violent campaigns, Chenoweth and Stephan
(2012) find that governments repressed about 90% of nonviolent campaigns.
While this finding shows that nonviolent campaigns are not safe from state re-
pression, it provides limited information, and further studies are required. First, the
NAVCO 1.1 categorizes a campaign as a civil resistance movement if the main method
of resistance when the campaign reaches its peak is nonviolent. In fact, there could
be violent actions within the nonviolent campaign; however, since using violence is
not the dominant strategy, the movement is coded as nonviolent. Second, the unit of
data in the NAVCO 1.1 is campaign, and it is time-invariant. We, therefore, cannot
develop and evaluate any hypotheses about the dynamics of dissent-repression nexus
based on the NAVCO 1.1.
The unit of reported data in NAVCO 2.0 and NAVCO 3.0 are respectively
campaign-year and protest-day. Thus, both the NAVCO 2.0 and the NAVCO 3.0
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provide useful information on temporal variations of governments’ and dissidents’ be-
havior. NAVCO 3.0 also reports the conflict events at the daily level. Consequently,
we can use these two datasets to evaluate empirically how the adopted methods of
resistance affect the interactions between the authorities and the protesters. The-
orizing how methods of resistance can impact the state repression/concession and
the participation size is beyond the scope of this project, and it can be explored
in the future studies; in this study, I only control for the methods of resistance by
protesters. To do so, I add two variables to my regression models. First one is the
average number of violent protests. If the NAVCO 3.0 reports that the type of action
is coded as ‘protest violently and riot’, I count that event as a violent protest. This is
different from an armed dissent. This type of action by the opposition is coded under
‘engage in violent combat.’ I, therefore, code any conflict events in which dissidents
use weapons under a new variable: armed protest.
The last control variable that I include in my model is the time span of protests.
The literature of contentious cycles76 discusses the effects of exhaustion on dissident
violence. Davenport 2014 also explores movement demobilization and its association
with the exhaustion over time. As more time passes, the probability of demobilization
and exhaustion increases. These studies predict that the demobilization of political
movements increases the likelihood of violent protest, which can increase/decrease the
level of state repression/concession. Thus, I include time-span, which simply counts
the number of periods from the start of the protests in each country during the Arab
Spring, to control for this effect. It also can control for other time-variant unobserved
factors. Finally, I add the lag of the dependent variables, i.e. participation size,
76Della Porta and Tarrow 1986
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repression, and concession, to control for inter-temporal effects. Table 5 reports the
summary statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables.
Table 5. Estimation results (NAVCO)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Violent protest 781 0.08 0.21 0 1
Armed protest 781 0.31 0.40 0 1
Participation size (%) 1,104 0.04 0.23 0 5.85
Time span 1,110 50.46 29.17 1 106
Concession 950 0.13 0.22 0 1
GDP per capita (log) 1,004 8.25 0.74 7.01 9.94
Population (log) 1,104 16.66 1.094 14.03 18.27
Repression 950 0.30 0.30 0 1
Foreign state intervention 730 0.822 1.11 0 4
IOs intervention 730 0.81 1.09 0 4
UNSC intervention 730 0.76 1.10 0 4
Since the standard deviation of error terms can be variant in our estimated re-
gression models, causing heteroskedasticity problem, I use the robust standard errors
method to address this issue. Endogeneity is a common issue in the literature, too.
I take two different actions to mitigate this problem. First, I lagged all variables on
the right-hand side of regression models, except time span; thought this might not
significantly resolve the issue. Second, although I included control variables in the
estimated regression models, we cannot certainly abandon these issues, including the
endogeneity problem, that omitted variables can cause. I, therefore, added country-
fixed effects to all models, so that I can control at least for time-invariant factors.
For instance, I explained above the problem with the missing data of regime types
variable for Syria and Bahrain. Adding these fixed-effects along side with the time
span variable help us to control for the effect of regime type which usually does not
change in the short-term. That is why when we add democracy to our models, the
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estimated coefficients of the independent variables do not change significantly, as the
effect of the regime type is already controlled using the fixed-effects variables.
3.3 Results Analysis
Table 6 reports the estimated effects of the foreign statements and threats on
the size of protests when civil conflict raises conditional on the control variables and
fixed-effects terms. The results in this table are estimated using fractional logit,
which are explained before. The estimated coefficients for the effect of disapproval
statements are neither consistent nor statistically significant at 10%. The estimated
coefficients of asking for political reform all positive across the different actors, but
they are not statistically significant. However, the estimated effects of the nonviolent
threats are positive and statistically significant across all types of actors. This means
that threatening the state with non-military punishments encourages political dissent.
The estimated coefficients for the violent threats, though positive, are not significant.
When we add FDI to our estimated models to evaluate its conditional effects on
the association between the foreign interventions and the dissent (columns 4-6), we
find more consistent results across different foreign actors although still the effects
of disapproval and political reform statements are not statistically significant. FDI
also does not make these two types of the foreign interventions effective since the
estimated coefficients for their interaction terms are not statistically significant. The
estimated coefficients of the nonviolent threats remain positive and statistically sig-
nificant after adding their interactions with FDI to the estimated models. This is
a noteworthy result since it shows that the nonviolent threats from the outside of
the state increases anti-government dissent independent of the state’s dependence on
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the foreign investment and the type of foreign actors. Moreover, the violent foreign
threats against the authorities reduce the anti-government protests if the state does
not receive foreign investment. However, as the foreign direct investment increases
these threats improve the size of protests, although these positive conditional effects
(1:47, 1:52, and 1:45) are smaller than the estimated baseline coefficients of the vi-
olent threats ( 1:76,  1:75, and 1:59). Thus, the effects of violent threats on the
participation size is always negative, but its amount is conditional on the level of
FDI.
Figure 8 shows the marginal effects of different types of diplomatic statements and
threats by the UNSC permanent members and Germany on the size of the protests.
Even though the disapproval of authorities’ behavior and asking for political reform
increase the participation, their marginal effects are not significantly different from
the cases that there is not a foreign intervention. The same story applies to the
violent threats. In addition, these threats have less positive effects on the size of
popular protests relative to the other types of the foreign reactions, and this type of
interventions is not statistically different from the no-response cases, because their
confidence intervals overlap. The estimated models in Table 2 show that in average,
the nonviolent threats by the foreign actors can have a positive effect on the size of
protests, yet we cannot conclude based on Figure 8 that these positive effects are
statistically different from adopting the no-response policy.
This rejects both Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b. In fact, the empirical anal-
ysis shows that the foreign statements and threats do not have a significant effect.
There can be different reasons for this observation. The first suggestion is that the
protesters during the Arab Spring responded positively to the foreign supports, yet
this effect was not statically different from the no-response policy. The second ex-
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Table 6. Estimation results for protest participation
Foreign states Int’ org. UNSC Foreign states Int’ org. UNSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign intervention
L.Disapprove -0.01 -0.07 0.15 -0.28 -0.51 -0.14
(-0.02) (-0.19) (0.42) (-0.71) (-1.31) (-0.34)
L.Political reform 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.67
(1.33) (1.43) (1.47) (1.06) (1.11) (1.10)
L.Nonviolent threat 0.96 1.10 1.03 1.07 1.18 1.14
(2.20) (2.73) (2.33) (2.35) (3.17) (2.50)
L.Violent threat 0.43 0.47 0.51 -1.76 -1.75 -1.59
(0.59) (0.61) (0.67) (-1.62) (-1.81) (-1.75)
L.Participation size 1.04 1.01 1.05 0.81 0.74 0.83
(1.15) (1.11) (1.14) (0.95) (0.85) (0.97)
L.Violent protest 1.14 1.12 1.12 0.80 0.67 0.73
(1.53) (1.51) (1.49) (0.97) (0.80) (0.84)
L.Armed protest 0.26 0.17 0.25 -0.13 -0.27 -0.16
(0.40) (0.27) (0.39) (-0.17) (-0.36) (-0.22)
L.Repression 1.21 1.20 1.24 1.27 1.20 1.28
(1.80) (1.75) (1.86) (1.86) (1.78) (1.86)
L.Concession 3.36 3.29 3.41 3.85 3.75 3.91
(4.76) (4.67) (4.72) (5.99) (5.99) (5.93)
L.Population (logged) -61.59 -63.14 -63.02 -13.46 -19.27 -14.37
(-3.26) (-3.35) (-3.34) (-0.78) (-1.06) (-0.82)
L.GDP per capita (logged) -0.70 -0.70 -0.65 14.02 13.88 13.99
(-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.53) (2.70) (2.71) (2.71)
Time span -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.58) (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.88) (-0.53) (-0.74)
L.FDI 0.07 0.04 0.07
(0.33) (0.20) (0.38)
L.Disapprove  FDI 0.18 0.32 0.19
(0.82) (1.45) (0.89)
L.Political reform  FDI -0.28 -0.24 -0.24
(-0.54) (-0.48) (-0.47)
L.Nonviolent threat  FDI 0.42 0.43 0.44
(1.49) (1.52) (1.54)
L.Violent threat  FDI 1.47 1.52 1.45
(2.31) (2.57) (2.53)
Intercept 1059.18 1086.06 1083.38 109.03 210.67 124.85
(3.21) (3.30) (3.29) (0.34) (0.63) (0.38)
N 476.00 476.00 476.00 445.00 445.00 445.00
Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 -0.95 -0.94 -0.95
chi2 308.86 340.65 305.28 364.07 408.34 352.13
AIC 137.66 137.66 137.66 166.54 166.53 166.54
BIC 46.02 46.02 46.02 55.89 55.89 55.89
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Figure 8. The marginal effects of interventions by UNSC members on the size of
protests.
planation can be that some of the discontented citizens responded positively and
some others reduced their participation, and at the aggregate level, the number of
these groups canceled out each other, so we do not observe a significant effect at
the macro-level. Teasing out these two different mechanisms at the micro-level and
studying the aggregation of their results at the macro-level requires individual-level
surveys, similar to Sullivan and Davenport (2017). Another method is tracking and
analyzing the discourse on social media during political dissent to extract data about
the variations in the protesters’ behavior.
Regarding the control variables, the results show that neither violent protests
nor armed protests have a significant effect on dissent. But, both repression and
concession have positive effects on the number of citizens who participated in the anti-
government protests, and this effect is stronger for concession. In fact, as discussed
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in the theoretical section of the paper, making any concessions can be perceived as a
sign of authorities’ weakness that persuade more people to join the anti-government
protests. Finally, the size of population decreases dissent participation, but it is
not statistically significant in the estimated models with the interaction terms of the
foreign interventions and FDI.
Table 7 presents the estimated effects of similar factors on state repression
(columns 1-3). Although the effects of the foreign disapproval statements and the
political reform demands mostly decrease state repression, these estimated effects
are not statistically significant at 10%. The estimated coefficients of the nonviolent
threats are positive and statically significant. The effects of the violent threats are
neither consistent nor statistically significant across different foreign actors. Includ-
ing the interactions of foreign interventions variables and FDI does not change the
results generally (columns 4-6).
The nonviolent threats by the foreign actors increase state repression; this effect
is statistically significant at 10% critical value when the actors are foreign states
and the UNSC countries. However, this effect is not significant for the IO actors.
This is consistent with our theoretical arguments that the state authorities use these
foreign interventions to blame political activists and accuse them of being foreign
agents. Making such an argument can be harder when the threat is imposed by an
international organization, though the authorities might argue that the IOs are biased
and serve the world powers’ will. Moreover, the violent threats only can decrease state
repression only if they come from the international organizations and the targeted
country receives a high level of foreign direct investment.
Figure 9 shows the marginal effects of the UNSC interventions on the state re-
pression. Among all of the different types of reactions, only the marginal effect of the
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Table 7. Estimation results for the state repression
Foreign states Int’ org. UNSC Foreign states Int’ org. UNSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign intervention
L.Disapprove 0.00 -0.08 0.04 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
(0.01) (-0.54) (0.23) (-0.56) (-0.47) (-0.56)
L.Political reform -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.14 0.06 -0.14
(-1.11) (-1.19) (-1.16) (-0.61) (0.28) (-0.63)
L.Nonviolent threat 0.53 0.51 0.60 0.47 0.43 0.51
(2.23) (2.07) (2.52) (1.77) (1.45) (1.94)
L.Violent threat 0.11 -0.05 0.13 0.94 1.74 0.54
(0.33) (-0.13) (0.42) (1.18) (1.61) (0.67)
L.Participation size -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.26 -0.28 -0.26
(-0.21) (-0.24) (-0.18) (-0.65) (-0.69) (-0.64)
L.Violent protest 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.57
(1.60) (1.60) (1.58) (1.62) (1.59) (1.57)
L.Armed protest 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09
(0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (-0.25) (-0.19) (-0.36)
L.Repression 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.24
(0.78) (0.72) (0.77) (0.64) (0.54) (0.67)
L.Concession 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.25
(0.46) (0.39) (0.43) (0.50) (0.41) (0.46)
L.Population (logged) 6.90 7.69 6.61 9.17 11.35 8.45
(0.78) (0.87) (0.75) (0.90) (1.09) (0.84)
L.GDP per capita (logged) 1.12 1.12 1.13 0.38 0.06 0.42
(2.96) (2.95) (2.99) (0.17) (0.03) (0.20)
Time span 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.44) (1.37) (1.49) (1.24) (1.09) (1.34)
L.FDI 0.06 0.08 0.05
(0.48) (0.72) (0.46)
L.Disapprove  FDI 0.08 0.01 0.10
(0.73) (0.09) (0.94)
L.Political reform  FDI -0.04 -0.19 -0.05
(-0.24) (-1.30) (-0.29)
L.Nonviolent threat  FDI 0.04 0.03 0.07
(0.28) (0.23) (0.59)
L.Violent threat  FDI -0.41 -0.81 -0.19
(-1.15) (-1.74) (-0.56)
Intercept -129.55 -143.11 -124.52 -162.90 -198.01 -150.82
(-0.85) (-0.95) (-0.82) (-0.90) (-1.07) (-0.84)
N 454.00 454.00 454.00 425.00 425.00 425.00
Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -234.45 -234.45 -234.34 -222.62 -222.52 -222.59
chi2 201.03 200.00 200.67 210.28 211.89 208.80
AIC 603.49 603.49 603.28 608.65 608.44 608.58
BIC 512.90 512.89 512.68 499.25 499.03 499.18
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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nonviolent threats is statistically different from no response cases, and it is positive.
That is, the nonviolent threats by the permanent members of the UNSC and Germany
only increases the use of coercive power by state authorities. Thus, these threats not
only cannot decrease the state repression, but also this policy leads to a higher level
of state repression. Here, the empirical results show that a non-response policy can
be a better policy than even the nonviolent threats, if the goal of the foreign actors
is making the state less repressive. This finding is consistent with the Hypothesis 1b.
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Figure 9. The marginal effects of interventions by UNSC members on state
repression.
The estimated coefficients of the control models mostly are not significant as only
the estimated coefficients of GDP per capita are positive and significant in three out
of six models (column 1-3). Specifically, the size of participation does not have a
significant effect on state repression. This can be because the authorities repressed
all anti-government uprisings during the Arab Spring, independent of the size of
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protests. Furthermore, this study explores the interactions between the authorities
and the dissidents at the weekly level, and this can be one the reasons that the
structural factors show less significance. In fact, the structural factors usually do not
change in the short-term, so we can expect that they have small explanatory power
when the sample is limited to similar countries.
In table 8, I estimate another group of models with the state concession as the
dependent variable. This helps us to explore whether the foreign interventions affect
the state concession. The estimated effects of these interventions on state conces-
sion across different foreign actors are mostly inconsistent and statically insignificant
(columns 1-3). The only significant coefficient shows that the disapproval of authori-
ties’ behavior in response to political dissent decreases the state concession only when
we consider all foreign countries. However, when we focus on IOs and the UNSC per-
manent members and Germany, their interventions do not have a significant effect.
When I add the interactions of these interventions with FDI to the regression
models (columns 4-6), the results become more significant. Both of the nonviolent
threats and the violent threats decrease the level of state concession if I focus on
any foreign states or the UNSC permanent members. However, if an international
organization (IO) asks for political reform, then authorities make more concessions.
A comparison of estimated coefficients of nonviolent and violent threats also reveals
that the state authorities become more repressive in the latter cases. Indeed, con-
sistent with my theoretical arguments, the violent threats give the authorities more
“convincing” excuse to use their coercive power against the dissidents. Looking at
the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms, they show that FDI has positive
effects on the state concession, yet they are not large enough to outweigh the negative
effects of the foreign interventions on the state concession.
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Table 8. Estimation results for the state concession
Foreign states Int’ org. UNSC Foreign states Int’ org. UNSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Concession
L.Disapprove -0.34 -0.01 -0.24 -0.23 0.13 -0.08
(-1.95) (-0.03) (-1.34) (-0.90) (0.54) (-0.32)
L.Political reform 0.26 0.43 0.31 0.59 1.07 0.66
(0.83) (1.39) (0.96) (1.35) (3.04) (1.50)
L.Nonviolent threat -0.27 0.05 -0.20 -0.75 -0.32 -0.69
(-0.98) (0.20) (-0.73) (-1.81) (-0.85) (-1.65)
L.Violent threat 0.02 0.42 -0.29 -2.92 -1.92 -2.40
(0.03) (0.73) (-0.48) (-2.01) (-1.24) (-2.14)
L.Participation size 0.24 0.20 0.27 1.01 1.08 1.06
(0.39) (0.30) (0.43) (1.43) (1.44) (1.49)
L.Violent protest 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.59
(1.47) (1.48) (1.46) (1.48) (1.54) (1.46)
L.Armed protest -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.24 -0.24 -0.21
(-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.38) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.68)
L.Repression 0.55 0.61 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.44
(1.52) (1.69) (1.45) (1.33) (1.33) (1.15)
L.Concession 1.17 1.24 1.18 1.02 1.08 1.01
(2.67) (2.83) (2.69) (2.30) (2.42) (2.28)
L.Population (logged) -5.99 -8.24 -6.21 -18.45 -18.65 -18.07
(-0.56) (-0.77) (-0.58) (-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.60)
L.GDP per capita (logged) -1.08 -1.12 -1.03 -8.97 -9.86 -9.47
(-2.36) (-2.39) (-2.26) (-3.32) (-3.72) (-3.53)
Time span -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-1.36) (-1.13) (-1.33) (-0.42) (-0.29) (-0.42)
L.FDI 0.07 0.13 0.10
(0.52) (1.10) (0.79)
L.Disapprove  FDI -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
(-0.14) (-0.30) (-0.54)
L.Political reform  FDI -0.09 -0.33 -0.10
(-0.33) (-1.47) (-0.37)
L.Nonviolent threat  FDI 0.31 0.21 0.31
(1.87) (1.29) (1.87)
L.Violent threat  FDI 1.29 0.95 0.91
(1.82) (1.31) (1.70)
Intercept 111.02 150.17 114.32 389.22 399.64 386.65
(0.60) (0.82) (0.62) (1.93) (1.94) (1.92)
N 454.00 454.00 454.00 425.00 425.00 425.00
Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -172.82 -173.21 -173.08 -162.64 -162.83 -162.90
chi2 77.45 80.66 76.70 89.55 94.35 93.48
AIC 480.24 481.02 480.75 488.68 489.06 489.20
BIC 389.65 390.42 390.15 379.27 379.65 379.79
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Figure 10 also compares the marginal effects of UNSC members’ interventions
on state concession with a no-response policy’s effect. The disapproval statements,
the nonviolent threats, and the violent threats decrease the level of state concession
relative to a non-response policy while asking for a political reform improves the
chance of the state concession. Thus, considering the estimated results in Table 4,
we cannot find any support for a positive effect of the foreign interventions on the
authorities’ decision about compromising on the status quo policies. In other words,
we do not find support for Hypothesis 2a in any of these models, and the estimated
models support the rival hypothesis of Hypothesis 2a, which is Hypothesis 2b.
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Figure 10. The marginal effects of interventions by UNSC members on state
concession.
Some might argue that political repression and state concession are dependent,
and we should estimate them as a system of equations. Here, the challenge is that
the error terms of these two equations can be correlated because there could be
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unobserved factors or omitted variables that affect both the state repression and the
state concession. I, therefore, repeat the above estimations of these two variables
using a SURE model, as I discussed in the previous section.
Checking the estimated residuals for these models confirms that these terms are
correlated. Table 9 and 10 report the estimation results for the SURE models respec-
tively without and with the interactions of the foreign interventions with FDI across
different types of foreign actors. The estimated results of Table 5 are consistent with
the findings in Table 7 and Table 8: the nonviolent threats increase state repression,
while it does not have statistically significant effects on the state concession (columns
1-3). Almost similar to estimated results of the models with the interaction terms
in Table 3 and 4, the SURE models show that the nonviolent threats by the foreign
states, and the UNSC permanent members and Germany just raise the level of the
state repression and reduce the chance of state concession. While FDI can have a pos-
itive effect on the authorities’ decision about making concessions, they are not strong
enough to totally offset the negative consequences of these foreign interventions.
3.4 Conclusion
Do the condemnation of state repression and the threats of imposing sanctions
and deploying military forces affect the interactions between authorities and dissidents
during civil conflicts? This paper explores two rival responses to this question. First,
it has been argued that the foreign interventions can increase the cost of using coercive
force for the governments, so we can expect that the diplomatic statements and
the threats during civil conflicts should decrease political repression, increase state
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Table 9. Estimation results for SURE models
Foreign states IOs UNSC
Repression Concession Repression Concession Repression Concession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Disapprove 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.13
(0.00) (-2.03) (-0.48) (0.06) (0.22) (-1.44)
L.Political reform -0.12 0.11 -0.12 0.21 -0.12 0.14
(-1.13) (0.67) (-1.16) (1.30) (-1.18) (0.82)
L.Nonviolent threat 0.30 -0.16 0.30 0.01 0.35 -0.13
(2.14) (-1.08) (2.01) (0.10) (2.39) (-0.84)
L.Violent threat 0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.23 0.07 -0.16
(0.35) (0.06) (-0.11) (0.78) (0.41) (-0.54)
L.Participation size -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.08 -0.07 0.10
(-0.31) (0.25) (-0.33) (0.21) (-0.29) (0.29)
L.Violent protest 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.35
(1.60) (1.49) (1.61) (1.47) (1.60) (1.47)
L.Armed protest 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.06
(0.11) (-0.44) (0.14) (-0.53) (0.07) (-0.39)
L.Repression (lagged) 0.16 0.26 0.15 0.29 0.15 0.25
(0.80) (1.36) (0.76) (1.51) (0.79) (1.29)
L.Concession (lagged) 0.16 0.68 0.14 0.72 0.15 0.69
(0.54) (2.77) (0.48) (2.91) (0.52) (2.80)
L.Population (logged) 4.07 -2.73 4.45 -4.04 3.92 -2.80
(0.80) (-0.47) (0.87) (-0.70) (0.76) (-0.48)
L.GDP per capita (logged) 0.63 -0.52 0.63 -0.54 0.63 -0.49
(2.94) (-2.30) (2.93) (-2.33) (2.98) (-2.19)
Time span 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(1.45) (-1.41) (1.39) (-1.15) (1.49) (-1.39)
Intercept -76.21 50.52 -82.63 73.46 -73.54 51.59
(-0.87) (0.51) (-0.94) (0.74) (-0.84) (0.52)
N 454.00 454.00 454.00
Log-likelihood -405.87 -406.25 -406.02
chi2 291.50 289.28 288.51
AIC 1087.05 1087.82 1087.35
BIC 901.73 902.50 902.03
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 10. Estimation results for SURE models (conditional effects)
Foreign states IOs UNSC
Repression Concession Repression Concession Repression Concession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Disapprove -0.07 -0.11 -0.05 0.09 -0.07 -0.04
(-0.57) (-0.91) (-0.42) (0.75) (-0.60) (-0.30)
L.Political reform -0.08 0.28 0.05 0.55 -0.08 0.32
(-0.57) (1.23) (0.34) (2.93) (-0.59) (1.38)
L.Nonviolent threat 0.27 -0.41 0.25 -0.17 0.29 -0.37
(1.65) (-2.03) (1.37) (-0.92) (1.79) (-1.85)
L.Violent threat 0.54 -1.65 1.00 -1.26 0.28 -1.29
(1.03) (-2.18) (1.38) (-1.52) (0.54) (-2.36)
L.FDI 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05
(0.50) (0.44) (0.79) (1.04) (0.48) (0.71)
L.Disapprove  FDI 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.04
(0.73) (-0.25) (0.10) (-0.44) (0.95) (-0.69)
L.Political reform  FDI -0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.19 -0.03 -0.06
(-0.28) (-0.37) (-1.37) (-1.56) (-0.33) (-0.40)
L.Nonviolent threat  FDI 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.17
(0.25) (1.96) (0.22) (1.33) (0.55) (1.96)
L.Violent threat  FDI -0.23 0.73 -0.46 0.61 -0.09 0.49
(-1.01) (1.94) (-1.50) (1.53) (-0.43) (1.76)
L.Participation size -0.17 0.50 -0.18 0.55 -0.17 0.53
(-0.69) (1.31) (-0.72) (1.38) (-0.69) (1.38)
L.Violent protest 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.34
(1.62) (1.51) (1.58) (1.55) (1.59) (1.47)
L.Armed protest -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10
(-0.27) (-0.72) (-0.23) (-0.73) (-0.38) (-0.63)
L.Repression 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.23 0.14 0.20
(0.65) (1.16) (0.57) (1.14) (0.68) (0.98)
L.Concession 0.18 0.59 0.15 0.62 0.17 0.59
(0.58) (2.35) (0.50) (2.47) (0.55) (2.35)
L.Population (logged) 4.99 -9.38 6.08 -9.59 4.57 -9.16
(0.87) (-1.51) (1.04) (-1.52) (0.80) (-1.48)
L.GDP per capita (logged) 0.08 -4.37 -0.15 -4.85 0.11 -4.62
(0.06) (-3.27) (-0.12) (-3.68) (0.09) (-3.48)
Time span 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(1.26) (-0.46) (1.13) (-0.31) (1.36) (-0.45)
Intercept -87.67 196.28 -104.69 203.52 -80.73 194.40
(-0.86) (1.79) (-1.01) (1.83) (-0.79) (1.78)
N 425.00 425.00 425.00
Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -383.83 -383.84 -384.05
chi2 312.90 326.18 314.36
AIC 1100.52 1100.54 1100.96
BIC 877.66 877.68 878.09
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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concession, and encourage more people to participate in the anti-government protests.
On the other hand, the authorities can use these foreign interventions to legitimize
the use of coercive force against their domestic opponents by calling them traitors
and foreign agents. Indeed, responding to the foreign pressure by making concessions
to the dissidents can send a signal of weakness to the domestic challengers and the
foreign rivals. Thus, the ruling party does not necessarily show more respect for
human rights after the foreign interventions.
The empirical findings of this study support the latter arguments. I find that for-
eign interventions are not beneficial in changing governments’ behavior when a civil
conflict arises. In fact, the disapproval statements, the sanction threats, and the mili-
tary actions, aiming to make repression costly, either do not change the governments’
respect for human rights or make the state authorities more repressive, depending
on the type of interventions or foreign actors. These findings also show that these
interventions do not improve the level of state concession. In fact, the diplomatic
statements either are ineffective, or hurt dissent by making authorities more willing
to repress and less willing to concede. Despite the failure in changing state authorities’
behavior, the nonviolent foreign threats can lead to a higher level of participation in
anti-government protests while violent interventions can decrease it. However, these
results are not statically different from a non-response policy. Overall, the foreign
interventions which are discussed in this study do not benefit dissent.
In addition to adding our understanding about the consequences of foreign inter-
ventions and the dissent-repression nexus, this study has important policy implica-
tions. Political activists and protesters from the inside and the outside of countries
experiencing civil conflict ask the foreign states and the international organizations
to support their anti-government movements by putting more pressure on the au-
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thorities from outside. However, this can give these authorities an excuse to become
more repressive. In other words, these interventions from the outside do not serve
their claimed goals in making governments less repressive. Thus, politicians and po-
litical activists should be more cautious about their public statements during civil
conflicts. These types of interventions often are not costly actions, while they can
relieve pressure on the foreign leaders and the international organizations to take an
action in response to the state repression in conflict areas. The political activists and
the leaders of opposition movements also should be aware that asking even diplomatic
support of foreign actors can make the authorities more repressive.
One area of research that the results of this study highlights is how authorities
use their propaganda campaign to re-frame the central issue of a civil conflict from
a legitimate uprising against the status quo to a fight against foreign interventions.
A more detailed investigation of this mechanism can be one of the avenues for the
future research.
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Chapter 4
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF POLITICAL DISSENT
Consider a polity with a group of citizens who are dissatisfied with the status quo;
however, changing it through democratic institutions is not an option due to either the
lack of democracy or the doubt about its efficiency. Some of these dissatisfied citizens,
therefore, form an opposition movement to put pressure on the state to change its
current policies through causing disruption in the governance of the country. The
desired change in policies will be realized if the aggregate of disruptions over time
reaches a certain level. Henceforth, this will be called targeted disruption, and it is
positively associated with the gap between the status quo and the desired policy.
The movement is limited to its resources. Since one of the most critical resources
for a successful opposition campaign is the popular support of the movement, I here
focus on the size of the movement for the sake of simplicity. But, we can extend
the following arguments by adding other resources such as capital into the model
at the cost of making the model more complex77. The opposition movement should
decide to allocate its members to violent and nonviolent actions to put the highest
level of pressure on the state authorities and achieve its political goals, which is
changing the status quo. The formal models of dissent-repression in the literature
have two main implications for studying political violence. First, DeNardo (1985),
Lichbach (1987), Moore (2000) explain the substitution effect of the state’ and the
movement’s strategies. Pierskalla (2010), Ritter (2014), and Chyzh and Labzina
77 We also can replace movement size with the human-capital ratio.
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(2018) also model the strategic interactions between the state and the dissents using
game-theory models.
However, these studies have three drawbacks. The first group does not explain
why the nonviolent movements can remain committed to civil resistance despite state
repression. In fact, based on Lichbach (1987)’s model, if the state uses its coercive
force to control nonviolent dissent, then the dissidents switch to the violent resistance.
These models, as discussed in detail below, predict that the opposition movement
never can be a pure nonviolent or violent campaign, since a linear combination of
these the violent strategies and nonviolent strategies is always preferred to either of
them. The second group of these formal models, the game theoretic models, also
cannot explain how the opposition movement allocates its sources to the violent
and nonviolent strategies. Finally, all of these models assume that the size of the
movement is determined exogenously; so, the interactions between the state and
the dissidents do not affect the size of the movement in the following periods. The
developed formal model in this chapter addresses these issues.
4.1 Allocating the popular support to violent and nonviolent strategies
Figure 11 shows all combination of contentious politics for the movement with a
hypothetical size of 50. The movement can choose any point on and below of the
blue line to cause disruption and put pressure on the state authorities. However,
since a rational movement does not waste its resources and uses all of its capacity,
the opposition movement does not pick a point below the blue line. Henceforth, I call
this line the action line. If we move toward the north-west on the line, the movement
allocates more resources to violent actions. Similarly, if we move on the line toward
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the south-east, then the movement decided to become more nonviolent by allocating
fewer resources to the violent actions. Thus, if the movement chooses point A, then
it is a fully violent movement while choosing point D makes the movement a fully
nonviolent movement. Points B and C also show movements which are partially
violent/nonviolent.
Figure 11. Different available combination of actions for a movement given its size,
which here is 50.
Now, the question is how a movement chooses the combination of its strategies
from these infinite numbers of options on the action line for a given movement size.
If we assume that the movement is pragmatic and purposeful, as assumed mostly in
the literature, and it only cares about achieving its goals, then the movement chooses
the combination that causes the maximum level of disruption. I do not reject the
importance of morality in opposition movements’ decision between the methods of
resistance; however, I do not model it here for a couple of reasons. First, if we assume
that morality and culture play the main role in the opposition movement’s decisions,
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then we do not need a theory to explain why the movement chooses nonviolent method
of resistance. Thus, a theory of dissent contributes to our understanding of dissent
violence if it shows under which conditions the movement that does not care about
morality prefers nonviolent resistance to violent resistance. Second, morality and
cultural factors can be added to this model easily for those who are interested in
molding their partial effects and their interactions with other factors.
Figure 12. The level of disruption for all possible combinations of violent and
nonviolent actions.
Figure 12 shows different levels of disruption if we assume that violent and nonvi-
olent actions are substitute with decreasing marginal rate of substitution, as assumed
by DeNardo (1985) and Lichbach (1987). By moving from the left-bottom to right-up
of the graph, the level of disruption increases; however, the level of disruption that
a movement can cause is limited to its size, determined by the position of the action
line. Therefore, if we add action line, Figure 12, to the disruption production frontiers,
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Figure 13, the point on the action line for which the slop of the action line is equal
to the slope of the marginal substitution between the violent and nonviolent actions
is the optimal combination of violent and nonviolent actions for the movement.
Figure 13. The change in the main method of resistance from nonviolent to violent
as a result of a decrease in the size of movement.
Figure 13 shows a hypothetical case in which the movement experiences a negative
change in its size. This change decreases the level of disruption as a result of a
decrease in the movement’s resources. In the figure, this change is shown as a shift in
the location of the action line toward the left-bottom, i.e. from the black line on the
right to the red dashed line on the left. When the size of the movement was larger,
most of its resources were allocated to the nonviolent actions, point A; however, in
response to this negative change in the size, the movement allocates main part of
its resources to violent actions, point B, to cope with the decrease in its size. This
increases the share of violent actions in the dissent. If the movement planned to
remain as nonviolent as it was at point A, then it should choose point C, causing
a lower level of disruption relative to point B. This change toward a more violent
strategy is what is predicated in contentious cycle theory (Della Porta and Tarrow
1986; S. Tarrow 1993) and DeNardo (1985)’s model.
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Although this argument is intuitive and straightforward, I showed in Chapter 2
that we cannot find robust empirical support for it. In fact, opposition campaigns
are rigid about changing their main method of resistance in response to a negative
change in their size. How can we explain this? One explanation as suggested by
DeNardo (1985) is that moral cost of resorting to violence is sufficiently high, and
this keeps the movement a civil resistance. However, although the moral values of
a movement can partially explain the commitment of a movement to the nonviolent
methods of resistance, it certainly does not explain some movements’ dedication to
nonviolent strategies. For instance, the 1979 Revolution in Iran is recognized as a
nonviolent movement, but the revolutionaries resorted to violence the night that they
toppled the regime. Linking the Iranian revolutionaries’ peaceful resistance to their
morality means that we should accept that a movement’s morality can vanish in just
a moment.
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t  1
Repressiont 1
Movement sizet 1
*
{Violent, Nonviolent}t 1
t+ 1
Repressiont+1
Movement sizet+1
*
{Violent, Nonviolent}t+1
Figure 14. A schematic view of static models of tactical choice in dissent-repression
literature.
Below I offer another explanation for the rigidity in the behavior of movements
through offering a dynamic model of political dissent. The classic models of dissent-
repression use a static theoretical framework to explain how the movement decides
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between the violent and nonviolent resistance. In fact, as Figure 14 shows, the move-
ment’s decision about its resistance strategy in these models is made in isolation from
its decisions in the other periods. However, as shown in Figure 15, I discuss in the
next section that the movement’s decision at time t is affected by its decisions in
the previous periods, and its current period’s decision about using violence affects
its future conditions and decisions. This is not a complex notion, but it has usually
been ignored in the formal modeling of the state-dissidents interactions. Despite its
conceptual simplicity, modeling it as a mathematical model can be challenging since
we should optimize not only the movements’ current decisions at time t given the
past optimal decisions, but also we need to explore what are the optimal strategies
at time t; t+ 1; t+ 2; ::: give the information at time t. In the next section I develop
a mathematical model of the movement’s inter-temporal decisions. Then I show how
we can use a computational approach to tackle this optimization problem.
t
Repressiont
Movement sizet
*
{Violent, Nonviolent}t
t  1
Repressiont 1
Movement sizet 1
*
{Violent, Nonviolent}t 1
t+ 1
Repressiont+1
Movement sizet+1
*
{Violent, Nonviolent}t+1
Figure 15. A schematic view of a dynamic model of tactical choice in
dissent-repression.
4.2 Assumptions and model setup
Let assume that the movement allocates its members to the nonviolent and violent
actions to cause disruption and put pressure on the state authorities at each period.
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I normalize the total population of the society to 1 and define 0 < St < 1 as the
share of the population that joined the movement at time t, that is the relative size
of the movement. 0 < t < 1 shows the share of the members that is allocated
to the nonviolent resistance at time t, and the remaining part of the movement, i.e.
1   t, launches violent attacks. Similar to Lichbach (1987) and Moore (2000), I
assume that the violent and nonviolent strategies are to some degree substitute for
each other. I also assume that violent strategies are more disruptive than nonviolent
actions.78 The object of the movement is to allocate its resources to the violent and
nonviolent actions to maximize the level of disruption and instability in the country.
The expectation is that as a result of this pressure on the state authorities, they
accept the protesters’ demands and change their policies.
While the movement’s goal is maximizing the level of pressure on the state, this
allocation decision is constrained by three inter-temporal constraints. First, all of the
formal models of dissent-repression in the literature assume that the negative effect
of state repression on the dissidents is proportional to the cost that the state incurs
to produce repression. This means that the movement loses part of its capacity due
to state repression. The size of this loss depends on the type and the severity of
the repression. Considering that it is easier for the state to justify and defend using
repression against the violent movements, adopting more violent strategies allows
the authorities to increase the use of coercive force against the movement. More
repression means more arrest, more torture, and more death which decrease the size,
and so the capacity, of the movement in the following periods.
Second, the state and the movement compete over the civilians’ support. Specifi-
78 If we assume that the nonviolent movements are more disruptive at each period, then it would
be redundant to argue why the opposition movements use the nonviolent strategies.
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cally, the movement tries to recruit the discontented citizens who have not decided to
join the movement yet. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) and Nepstad (2011) dis-
cussed, nonviolent movements have a better chance to engage the dissatisfied citizens
since the cost of political participation is lower when the movement is nonviolent. In
fact, adopting nonviolent strategies decreases the likelihood of state repression, and
the movement can attract domestic and foreign support more. On the other hand,
resorting to violence discourages the undecided civilians to join the movement in the
next periods. Similar to the previous mechanism, this also shows that resorting to
violence at the current period has costly consequences for the movement in the future,
which is a smaller movement and a lower capacity for putting pressure on the state.
Two above mechanisms show that using violence has adverse consequences on the
size of the movement in the future, yet violence also can be beneficial to the move-
ment. ‘Exhaustion’ is discussed in the contentious cycle theories79 as a factor that
depreciates the size of the movement. However, since the theoretical framework in the
contentious cycle theory is static, the exhaustion of the movement is only modeled
as an exogenous shock. However, as Davenport (2014) explores the demobilization of
political movements, the size of an opposition movement is directly associated with
the perception of the members of the movement about the likelihood of its success.
Successful disruption and putting pressure on the state authorities at each period,
therefore, make the members of the movement more optimistic about achieving their
goals. Similarly, a period of low disruption has negative effects on the movement.
First, this period with low disruption is an opportunity for the state to revitalize.
Second, some of the dissatisfied citizens and the members of the movement may
consider this poor performance as a sign of weakness for the movement. Thus, the
79S. Tarrow 1993
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movement is always tempted to resort to violence to maximize the pressure on the
state authorities and to minimize the level of movement exhaustion/.
We can summarize these three inter-temporal mechanisms that limit movements
optimization problem as follow:
• V iolencet" ) Repressiont" ) (Arrested; injured;& dead members)t" )
Movement sizet+1# (Negative effect)
• V iolence" ) Et(Participation costt+1)" )Movement sizet+1# (Negative effect)
• V iolence" ) For a given level of human resource; disruption" )
Dusruptiont" and Movement sizet+1" (Positive effect)
The state authorities also respond to the dissent considering the size of the protests
and the level of violence in these protests. I assume that when the state pays the
legitimacy cost of repressing the movement, the authorities keep the level of political
repression high to control the dissent as soon as possible. Considering the objec-
tive function and the above inter-temporal constraints, we can write the movement’s
dynamic optimization model as follow:
max0t1
1X
t=0
tflog(1 + tSt) + log(1 + (1  t)St)g s:t: (4.1)
St = (1 Rt 1)St 1 + (1 Rt 1)t 1(1  St 1) 8t (4.2)
Rt = maxfR^1;    ; R^tg 8t (4.3)
R^t =
1
1 + 
(log(1 + t) + log(1 + St)) 8t (4.4)
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4.3 Suggested mathematical solutions
I use Dynamic Programming approach to solve this recursive optimization prob-
lem. It can be shown that the sequence of value functions of finite-horizon problems
converges uniformly to the value function of the infinite-horizon problem (Hansen and
Sargent 2013). vj(:) is defined as the value function in jth iteration. This function
only needs to be bounded and continuous, so we can show there is a sequence of value
functions vj(:) such that v = limt!1vj where v satisfies below Bellman Equation:
v( 1) = max0<<1f log(S) + log((1  )S + v()g s:t: (4.5)
S = (1 R 1)S 1 + (1 R 1) 1(1  S 1) (4.6)
R 1 = maxfR^1;    ; R^kg (4.7)
Due to the complexity of solving this optimization problem, finding its optimal
solution using a reduced form equation is not possible. I, therefore, use a computa-
tional approach to simulate a sequence of solutions to find an optimal solution for this
problem. I compute the limit of vn(:) when n!1 through calculating the sequence
of value functions as follow:
v1( 1) = max0<<1f log(S) + log((1  )S) + v0()g (4.8)
v2( 1) = max0<<1f log(S) + log((1  )S) + v1()g
...
vn+1( 1) = max0<<1f log(S) + log((1  )S) + vn()g
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4.3.1 Initial values & convergence conditions
To solve the above computational model, I need to choose the initial values of the
parameters and to specify the convergence assumptions. These values are as follow:
• Discount factor:  = 0:95
• Initial repression: R0 = :8
• The substitution parameter of resistance methods:  = :9
• Initial size of the movement: S0 = :1
• Convergence conditions:
– jjV j+1   V jjj < 0:01, or
– Maximum iterations = 400
4.4 Simulation results
I run this computational model twice. First, I assume that the allocation of the
movement’s resources to the violent and nonviolent actions, i.e. , in each period is
independent of what happened in the past and will not effect the optimal levels of 
in the future. This static model is the adopted modeling approach in the literature.
I consider this static model as my benchmark model.
I also simulate a second group of models in which the movement should deal
with the consequences of its previous decisions and be careful about the effects of
its current decisions on the size of the movement in the future. This is called the
dynamic model, below.
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1. The static model: The law of motion is St+1 = (1   Rt)St + (1   Rt)(1   St)
(Figure 16).
2. The dynamic model: The law of motion is St+1 = (1 Rt)St+(1 Rt)t(1 St)
(Figure 17).
Figure 16. The benchmark model without inter-temporal dependencies.
For both of these cases, I exogenously added a negative size shock at t = 25 to
study how the movement reacts to this shock under these static and dynamic models.
Figures 16 and 17 present the simulation results for the static model and the dynamic
model, receptively. In the benchmark model (Figure 16), the movement is very sensi-
tive to a negative size shock such that the movement chooses to increase the level of
violent actions to deal with this decrease in the size of the movement. Furthermore,
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when the initial size of the movement is small, a relatively high initial level of violence
is adopted as a strategy to recruit more members, then the movement returns to a
lower level of violence. Finally, the movement’s major method of resistance always is
violence as it allocates more than 50% of its resources to violent protests. In other
words, the benchmark model fails to explain nonviolent resistance.
On the other hand, the suggested dynamic model in this study (Figure 17) remains
nonviolent in response to a negative shock in its size at time t = 25. Furthermore,
the movement does not need resort to violence to recruit new members. Instead,
the movement can rely on its civil method of resistance to recruit more individuals,
though it takes a longer to recruit new members. Finally, we can show that even
though the assumed objective function is convex, so the linear combination of violent
and nonviolent actions are preferred to their pure strategy (Lichbach (1987)’s finding),
the optimal strategy can be pure nonviolent resistance, zero violence, when we use a
dynamic model.
These two graphs reveal at least three noteworthy points. First, between the
static model and the dynamic model, only the latter can explain the resilience and
the commitment of the movement to nonviolence resistance. Second, the static model
predicts that the optimal strategy in every period is allocating the main part of the
resources to the violent actions. However, the dynamic model predicts that the
movement allocates all of its resources to the nonviolent actions since this strategy
helps to recruit more people. Third, this computational model allows us to see how
the size of the movement, as the main available resource to the movement, changes
over time as the state and the dissidents interact. In the literature, we do not find such
an explicit study of the changes in the size/resources of the opposition movements.
As I mentioned before, this computational model is similar to a lab that can
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Figure 17. The suggested model with inter-temporal dependencies.
be used for simulating different scenarios, and this can be an important tool in the
conflict literature, where conducting experiments is either infeasible or too costly.
For instance, I assumed that the discount factor is .9 in the model. This means
that the value of tomorrow is 95% of the value of today. Put it differently, if the
movement topples the regime tomorrow, the value of this success is 95% of the value
of overthrowing the state today. In fact, this parameter shows the patience of the
movement.
Figure 17 shows that the movement remains patient in recruiting new members
since resorting to violence can negatively affect the size of the movement in future.
What does happen if the members of the movement were not as patient as we as-
sumed? To answer this question, I decrease the discount factor from  = :95 to
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 = :3. This means that the members of the movement think that if the wait one
more period to overthrow the regime, the value of this success is about 68% lower
than achieving this goal today. Thus, they are ready to bear more cost to overthrow
the regime as soon as possible. This cost is using violence and dealing with its neg-
ative consequence at the current and the future periods. Now, let see if the model
predicts this behavior. Figure 18 presents the simulation of the movement behavior in
response to a negative size shock at time t = 25 for the dynamic model with  = :3.
Unlike Figure 17, the movement responds with resorting violence in response to a
decrease in its size since here the members of the movement are not patient enough
to remain nonviolent to cope with this negative resource shock.
Figure 18. The reaction of a less patient movement to a negative shock in its size,
i.e.  = :95!  = :3 with inter-temporal dependencies.
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4.5 Calibration: The empirical evaluation of dynamic models
While econometrics is the prevalent method for quantitative evaluation of social
science theories, including the conflict literature, it is not the only one. Kydland
and Prescott (1982)’s seminal work on business cycles is recognized for the developed
theory in the paper and the empirical method that used by the authors to evaluate
their theoretical arguments. In this paper, Kydland and Prescott suggest and employ
calibration as a new method for studying dynamic stochastic models. The calibration
method, as a deductive inference, is different from statistical estimation, inductive
inference. Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette, and Belitz (1994) define calibration as follow:
In earth sciences the modeler is commonly faced with the inverse prob-
lem: The distribution of the dependent variable (for example hydraulic
head) is the most well known aspect of the system; the distribution of the
independent variable is the least well known. The process of tuning the
model – that is the manipulation of the independent variable to obtain a
match between the observed and simulated distribution or distributions
of a dependent variable or variables– is known as calibration(642-643).
The calibration is one of the methods that macroeconomists developed to address
Lucas critique80 of econometric policy evaluation. Lucas contends that any changes
in policy can affect the parameters relevant to the decision maker while in economet-
ric models, we assume that these parameters do not change over time. For example,
when the method of resistance in a movement changes from nonviolent to violent, the
state’s attitude toward using repression can change as well; however, in the econo-
metric models, we estimate one model to study the state’s behavior both before and
after the change in the movement’s behavior. By reviewing the International Rela-
tions literature, we easily can find similarities between Lucas’ critique about testing
80Lucas 1976
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economic models and the constructivists’ critiques81 about the rational choice models.
In fact, the main problem of the rational choice models is not its failure in modeling
changes in the preferences, as highlighted by the constructivists, but the employed
statistical methods, i.e. estimation-based approaches, fail to test these changes in the
actors’ preferences, as discussed by Lucas. In other words, even if the rational choice
scholars theoretically model changes in preferences, as I did above, using econometric
models does not offer a solution for testing them.
The developed mathematical model in this chapter lets us employ the calibra-
tion method, as an alternative empirical approach, to study how the changes in
both structural and behavioral factors affect the state-dissent interactions and their
outcomes over time. In this approach, instead of estimating the parameters of a sta-
tistical model, we divide the sample into two sub-samples. We first fit the developed
mathematical model into the first sub-sample and calibrate the models, and then we
cross-validate this calibrated model using the second sub-sample.
This does not suggest that we should forget about the econometric models. Indeed,
the estimated econometric models in the literature can be used for finding the initial
values of the parameters in the calibration models, especially the structural factors
are.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed a dynamic model of dissent-repression. The formal
theories of the interactions between the state and the dissidents have two drawbacks.
They cannot explain the commitment of the successful nonviolent campaigns to the
81For example, see Wendt (1987) and Ruggie (1998).
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civil resistance despite state repression and the fluctuations in the movement’s size.
The developed game-theory models also do not explain how the opposition movement
allocates its sources to the violent and nonviolent strategies. Finally, all of these mod-
els assume that the size of the movement is determined exogenously; so, they cannot
describe how the interactions between the state and the dissidents can affect the size
of the movement, and so its adopted methods of resistance, in the following periods.
I contend that if we allow an inter-temporal dependency between the movement’s
decision over time, then we can address the above issues using a recursive dynamic
model. In addition, I show that the computational model that I developed here can
be used for exploring different scenarios of the state-dissent interactions. Finally, I
suggest that the developed formal model in this chapter can be used for the calibra-
tion of an empirical model of dissent-repression, as an alternative for studying the
state’s and the dissidents’ behavior.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
The project explores why and when political actors resort to violence. What
makes this project different from the current literature of political conflict is that we
need to focus on the interactions between governments and dissidents, in addition
to studying the structural factors affecting the nexus of dissent-repression. Most of
the literature focused on how the structural factors, which mostly do not change in
the short-term, affect the use of violence by the state and the dissidents. Recent
studies that focused on strategic interactions developed new hypotheses, yet they
again use the structural factors to operationalize their mechanisms and evaluate their
theories. In this project, I contend that dynamic factors that are the outcomes of
the interactions between the state and the protesters should be investigated and
discussed for explaining the dynamics of political violence. I explore this argument
in three chapters.
After a review of the literature in Chapter 1, the second chapter argues that
the risk of demobilization shapes oppositions movements’ evaluation of the trade-
off between violent and nonviolent resistance, and thus affects the risk of dissident
violence. In fact, nonviolent method of resistance serves as a recruitment and mo-
bilization strategy, keeping the movement committed to civil resistance. However,
the demobilization of the movement dilutes this commitment to nonviolent tactics,
so the favorable consequences of resorting to violence outweigh the adverse conse-
quences, and the movement becomes more prone to use violence for the sake of its
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survival. In contrast, the movement is under no compulsion to use violent tactics if
the mobilization of the discontented citizens is successful.
Consistent with the literature, this study maintains that recruitment problems
cause dissident violence. However, this association does not hold in the short-term
because of the adverse consequences of using dissident violent for the movement. If
we replace the static models of resource mobilization with a dynamic version, then
we can explain how lasting, not temporary, mobilization problems over time signal
the movement to use violence to prevent its death. Knowing the effect of these
(de)mobilization dynamics on the movement’s evaluations allows us to model when
dissident violence is more likely.
The analysis of movement mobilization and demobilization patterns also reveals
a counter-intuitive nonlinear association between the expansion of movements and
dissident violence. A moderate increase in the size of the movement decreases the
risk of violence because of the rise of popular support. However, a large expansion of
the movement overburdens its monitoring and sanctioning capacities, raising the risk
of dissident violence.
In Chapter 3, I focus on the state side of the political conflict and answer an un-
derstudied mechanism in the literature: do the condemnation of state repression and
the threats of imposing sanctions and deploying military forces affect the interactions
between authorities and dissidents during civil conflicts? To answer this question, I
develop two rival answers and evaluate them empirically. First, it has been argued
that foreign interventions can increase the cost of political repression for the state au-
thorities, so it is expected that diplomatic statements and threats during civil conflict
should decrease political repression, increase state concession, and encourage more
people to participate in anti-government protests. On the other hand, the state can
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use the foreign interventions to delegitimize the dissent and legitimize the protesters
by calling them traitors and foreign agents. Responding to the foreign pressure by
making concessions to the dissidents can send a weakness-signal to the domestic chal-
lengers and foreign rivals. Thus, the state does not necessarily tolerate the dissent
more and does not become more willing to concede after the foreign interventions.
These two rival arguments are examined empirically, and I find that the foreign
interventions are not beneficial in changing governments’ behavior when a civil conflict
arises. The disapproval statements, sanction threats, and military actions that target
the state to make repression costly, either do not change governments’ respect for
human rights or make the state authorities more repressive, depending on the type of
interventions or foreign actors. These findings also show that these interventions do
not improve the level of state concession. Thus, the diplomatic statements either are
ineffective, or they hurt the dissent by making the authorities more willing to repress
and less willing to concede. Despite the failure in changing the state’s behavior,
the nonviolent foreign threats can lead to a higher level of participation in the anti-
government protests while violent interventions can decrease it.
Chapter 4 presents a formal model of dissent-repression. The formal theories of
interactions between the state and the dissidents have two drawbacks. They cannot
explain the commitment of the successful nonviolent campaigns to the civil resistance
despite state repression and the fluctuations in the movement’s size, which are dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. The developed game-theory models in the literature also do
not explain how the opposition movements decide about their methods of resistance.
Finally, all these models assume that the size, or capability, of the movement is deter-
mined exogenously; so, they cannot explain how the interactions between the state
and the dissidents affect the size of the movement, and thus its adopted methods of
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resistance. I show that if we allow an inter-temporal dependency between the move-
ment’s decisions over time, then we can address the above issues using a recursive
dynamic model. In addition, the computational model that I developed here can be
used for investigating different scenarios of the state-dissent interactions. Finally, I
suggest that the developed formal model in this chapter can be used for the calibra-
tion of an empirical model of dissent-repression, as an alternative for studying the
state’s and the dissidents’ behavior.
Due to improvements in information and communication technology as well as
the advances in computational power of computers, there are more spatially and tem-
porally disaggregated conflict datasets available to conflict scholars. This affords an
opportunity for moving beyond the structural factors such as regime type, economic
development, and ethnic heterogeneity to study the dynamics of political violence in
smaller time-frame. No doubt, we need to know whether, for instance, signing and
ratifying human rights treaties make a state less repressive; however, the behavior of
the state authorities during peace times can be different from their behavior during
civil conflicts. Since political dissent increases the frequency and severity of state
repression and dissident violence, developing theories that investigate the transition
of political disagreements to contentious nonviolent politics, and then to violent pol-
itics, can help us to have a better understanding of political violence. During these
transitions, the political environment changes, and the structural factors are not good
proxies for these changes.
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APPENDIX A
THE MATLAB CODE FOR THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL IN CHAPTER 4
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clear all;
close all;
tic
global v0 beta amat a0 agrid R0 teta s0 s i R a11 T e ne
beta=0.95;
R0=.8;
teta=.9;
s0=.1;
tol = 0.01;
maxits = 400;
dif = tol+1000;
its = 0;
agrid = 99; amin=0;
amax=1;
grid=(amax-amin)/agrid;
amat=amin:grid:amax;
amat=amat’;
[N,n]=size(amat);
v0 = zeros(N,1);
e=normrnd(0,.2,N,1);
ne=zeros(N/2,1);
ne(N/2,1)=-.3;
while dif>tol && its<maxits
for i=1:N
a0 = amat(i,1);
a1 = fminbnd(@valfun22,amin,amax);
v1(i,1) = -valfun22(a1);
a11(i,1) = a1;
R1=(1.2*log(1+a11(i,1))+log(1+s(i,1)))/2.2;
if i==1
R(i,1)=R1;
else
R(i,1)=max(max(R),R1);
end
end
dif = norm(v1-v0)
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v0=v1;
its=its+1;
end
for i=1:N
Vstar(i,1)=1-a11(i,1);
end
V(1,1)=v1(1,1);
for i=2:N
V(i,1)=(betaî)*v1(i,1)+V(i-1,1);
end
V=V/max(V);
T=80;
figure
plot(1:1:T,Vstar(1:T),1:1:T,s(1:T),’LineWidth’,2)
title([’=’ num2str(teta) ’ , S0=’ num2str(s0) ’ , =’ num2str(beta)])
xlabel(’Time’)
ylabel(’Movement Size & Movement Strategy’)
legend(’Violence’,’Movement Size’, ’Total Disruption’)
xlim([1 T])
ylim([0 1])
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